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The co-performation of financial economics in accounting standard-setting: A study of 







This paper adds to the literature on the role of financial economics in accounting standard-
setting by analyzing the co-performation of an economic theory – the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) – in the construction of a new approach to accounting for credit losses in 
financial reporting. Inspired by actor-network theory and its notions of performativity and 
translation, the paper draws on interview data and documents to reconstruct the process by 
which the devalued “incurred loss” impairment model was replaced with a more forward-
looking “expected loss” approach under IFRS in response to the 2008 financial crisis. This 
comprised of a series of experiments and negotiations, including an unsuccessful effort to 
establish an “ideal”-type model and the failure of a joint initiative between the IASB and the 
FASB. Alongside extensive considerations over how to make the approach operational, the 
influence of the EMH regarding the relationship between loan pricing and initial expectations 
of credit losses is elucidated. We show how a standard-setting objective grounded in financial 
economics is translated through a process of approximation as it forges linkages with other 
matters of concern. This process sheds light on the transformations involved in finding 
tolerable solutions when utilizing financial economics in the setting of accounting standards. 
 
Keywords: IFRS; Financial instruments; Impairment; Efficient Market Hypothesis; 























First of all, forcing banks to recognise expected lifetime losses on the day they make the loans 
clearly does not reflect the economics. Booking a loan on market terms does not cause the bank 
to suffer a loss immediately. Day-one losses based on lifetime expected losses could be quite 
substantial, especially for long-term loans such as 30-year mortgages. Booking a loss on Day 
one would cause loans to be on the books at amounts substantially below their true value, thus 
creating a distorted picture. 





As the preceding quote exemplifies, accounting standard-setters are often influenced by a 
desire to accurately reflect the underlying economics of business activity. Drawing on the 
precepts of financial economics, standard-setters are equipped with potentially powerful tools 
which aim to propel the standard-setting process towards its “correct” conclusion (Himick & 
Brivot, 2018). As Hopwood (1992) posits, “Economics … is seen as a means for helping 
accounting to become what it should be, but what currently it is not” (p. 128). Along these 
lines, previous research highlights the increasing influence of financial economic thought on 
accounting standards (Bougen & Young, 2012; Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009; Young, 2014) 
and conceptual frameworks (Erb & Pelger, 2015; Power, 2010; Pelger, 2016; Young, 2006). 
Nevertheless, as Power (2010) points out, the application of financial economics in financial 
accounting remains “partial, impure and pragmatic” (p. 209). One explanation for this is that 
the theories of financial economics, such as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) stimulated 
by Fama (1965), are both abstract and empirically uncertain (Whitley, 1986). In addition to 
challenges to the notion of market efficiency from within the discipline of economics (e.g., 
Shiller, 1981), pragmatism in the realm of financial accounting often generates obstacles to the 
application of the doctrine (Power, 2010). In light of this and the dearth of research on the 
operationalization of financial economic theory in standard-setting, we propose that the manner 




There is a recent interest in the performativity of economics across the social sciences (Callon, 
2007; Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2009; MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu, 2007; Pollock & 
D’Adderio, 2012), in finance studies (Mackenzie, 2006; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003; Vollmer, 
Mennicken, & Preda, 2009; Warren & Seal, 2018), in accounting (Cushen, 2013; MacKenzie, 
2009; Andon, Baxter, & Chua, 2007; Skærbæk & Tryggestad, 2010) and in financial reporting 
(Huikku, Mouritsen, & Silvola, 2017; Robson & Young, 2009; Robson, Young, & Power, 
2017). Whilst the 2008 financial crisis stimulated criticism of financial economic theory 
(Arnold, 2009; Cooper, 2015; Gendron & Smith-Lacroix, 2015), the apparent lack of a coherent 
alternate philosophy suggests that its influence in accounting standard-setting may persevere 
(Power, 2010). This case points to a significant post-crisis scenario in which a model inspired 
by the EMH is subjected to several transformations as opposed to being passively transported 
into accounting standards. This underscores that financial economic theories must be translated 
into specific accounting standard-setting networks to facilitate their tolerability.  
 
While the relaxation of fair value accounting requirements constituted the most highly-
publicized accounting event in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (André et al., 2009; 
Bengtsson, 2011; Carruthers, 2017; Laux & Leuz, 2009, 2010; Plantin, Sapra, & Shin, 2008), 
arguably the most significant financial reporting response to the crisis relates to the 
redevelopment of the impairment requirements for financial assets. Due to its apparent inability 
to anticipate many of the sizable loan defaults experienced by financial institutions during the 
financial meltdown, the incurred loss model for loan loss provisioning was attributed with the 
label of “too little too late” (European Union, 2015). This represented a significant component 
of the apportionment of blame towards accounting standards for exacerbating the crisis; claims 
that were subsequently supported by evidence on the reluctance of banks to report loan losses 
facilitated by “discretion in the accounting rules” (Laux & Leuz, 2010, p. 113). Accordingly, 
the IASB and the FASB were besieged with calls for a more “forward-looking” approach to 
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impairment (G20, 2009; Lagneau-Ymonet & Quack, 2012) to reduce procyclicality (FSF, 
2009b). Drawing on an analysis of consultative documents and interview data, this paper 
follows the efforts to reconstruct the financial asset impairment model in IFRS over a six-year 
period from 2009-2014 which included a convergence attempt with the FASB. 
 
To frame our study, we draw on Callon (1998b, 2007) who posits that economics co-performs 
the economy often with considerable support from accounting tools. Callon equates the 
formulae produced by accountants with economics in terms of their capacity to format the 
economy as “[a]ny tinkering with the formula can have considerable consequences because it 
changes the world that the formula is supposed to activate” (Callon, 2007, p. 334). Thus, we 
endeavor to better comprehend how economic rationales permeate the standard-setting process 
and affect its outcomes. To trace these alterations and their stability, we make use of the 
sociology of translation (Callon, 1986; Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2009; Callon & Latour, 
1981). From this perspective, we regard accounting standard-setting processes as efforts 
involving an extensive number of actors to problematize, experiment, evaluate, and decide on 
proposed solutions that may more or less smoothly result in the issuance of a new standard. 
Particularly, we highlight the role of tolerability in the provisional stabilization of proposed 
accounting standards that draw on the discipline of financial economics. 
 
The paper contributes by illuminating the transformations associated with enacting the doctrine 
of financial economics in accounting standard-setting. Whilst the literature has depicted how 
economic principles are utilized to rationalize accounting standard-setting projects 
(Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009; Young, 2014; Young & Williams, 2010), extant research has 
largely pointed to instances in which financial economic metrics have been successfully 
deployed. A prominent exception is the work of Himick and Brivot (2018) which analyzes the 
efforts of an epistemic community inspired by financial economics that was eventually 
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unsuccessful in persuading an accounting standard-setting organization to adopt its proposed 
approach. Nonetheless, studies on accounting standard-setting have not shed much light on 
how “pure” solutions based on financial economic theories transform as part of a process of 
negotiation. In this case, although the IASB’s initial attempt to apply the EMH in an idealized 
form was ineffectual, its eventual model provisionally linked the economic theory to other 
matters of concern by means of approximating the outcome of its ideal-type approach. 
Meanwhile, tasked with a similar mandate, the FASB did not make use of an EMH-inspired 
objective despite its purportedly strong affiliation with financial economic thought. We thus 
provide a rich field study to show how financial economics interacts with more pragmatic 
concerns to form distinctive – and “impure” – standard-setting solutions. In addition, the paper 
elucidates a prominent example of the failure of the IASB–FASB convergence initiative due 
to a number of disparate concerns across two networks which were unable to be reconciled. 
This sheds light on the struggles involved in constructing tolerable accounting standards for a 
geographically diverse constituency. 
 
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. In the next section, research 
pertaining to the influence of economics on financial reporting is highlighted followed by an 
outline of the theoretical framework adopted in the paper. Subsequently, the research methods 
employed in the study are delineated. The paper then proceeds to analyze the IASB project to 
reform loan loss provisioning in the wake of the global financial crisis. The paper concludes 
with discussion and conclusion sections which recap the contributions of the study. 
 
2. Financial economics, accounting and standard-setting 
 
Irrespective of the valuation-usefulness objective stipulated in the joint IASB–FASB 
conceptual framework (IASB, 2010b) which allegedly situates present-day financial reporting 
squarely in the purview of financial economics (Müller, 2014), accounting in itself does not 
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encompass an intrinsic purpose (Hopwood, 1992, 2007; Miller, 1998). Accordingly, in addition 
to the “faithful reporting of financial information” (Solomons, 1991, p. 293), the literature has 
outlined a multitude of possible roles of accounting in society (Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, 
Hughes, & Nahapiet, 1980; Tinker, 1991; Walker, 2016). Nevertheless, although accounting 
often derives its directionality from wider economic objectives (Hopwood, 1992), the specific 
formulation of purposes classified as ‘economic’ has been observed to vary in the literature. 
Along these lines, studies have depicted the transition in this relationship from the influence of 
economic theories on accounting income to a view of accounting as an information commodity 
(Robson & Young, 2009). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that accounting may be 
mobilized in the attainment of particular economic objectives. For instance, this may be 
discerned by reference to the usage of discounted cash flow techniques first described by Miller 
(1991) and the impact of concerns over economic growth on inflation accounting illuminated 
by Robson (1994). This suggests that the “internal accounts” generated in accounting have 
“external origins” which link accounting with distinctive contexts (Hopwood, 1983, p. 301). 
Thus, it has been argued that accounting is not a static apparatus since it transforms alongside 
economic and social change (Chapman, Cooper, & Miller, 2009).  
 
Whilst the preceding literature posits that the influence of economics on accounting is 
multifarious and context-dependent, recent studies have tended to draw attention to the 
increasing application of financial economic thought particularly in the domain of accounting 
standards. As Hopwood (2009a) argues, “accounting has been in the process of becoming 
similar to economics and particularly financial economics” (p. 892). Ostensibly, “accounting’s 
fundamental substance has changed” (Bayou, Reinstein, & Williams, 2011, p. 114) from 
“accounting as history” to “accounting as economics” (Barker & Schulte, 2017, p. 2). As such, 
it has been suggested that accounting standard-setters are steered by “the underlying logic of 
neoclassical economics” (Young & Williams, 2010, p. 519). This may be discerned by the rise 
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of neoclassical valuation theories in the promotion of discounted cash flow and fair value 
measurements in financial reporting (Chiapello, 2008). Particularly in light of the 2008 
financial crisis, there is a growing fascination with fair value accounting (Hopwood, 2009b) 
and its grounding in “the cultural authority of financial economics” (Power, 2010, p. 201). 
 
The influence of financial economics in financial reporting has also been attributed to the 
capacity of individual actors to enact decisions based on this philosophy (Miller & Power, 
2013). As such, studies have demonstrated that the precepts of rational economic theory 
associated with “Chicago neoliberalism” particularly resonates with U.S. based accounting 
standard-setters (Pelger, 2016, p. 58). For instance, studies have illustrated the deployment of 
financial economic thought in regards to the development of the accounting standard on 
employee stock options by the FASB. Following Ravenscroft and Williams (2009), this 
standard was grounded in the presumption – consistent with financial economic theory – that 
options granted to employees are a form of compensation that can be quantified using a 
“mechanical model” (p. 782). To justify its necessity, the FASB utilized arguments based on 
economic theory and referred to several economists who supported the standard (Young, 2014). 
 
Moreover, the conceptual frameworks of financial reporting provide a foundation for 
accounting standard-setters’ attempts to depict an objective social world (Hines, 1991). For 
instance, the objective of decision-usefulness adopted in the joint IASB–FASB conceptual 
framework is predicated upon mainstream economic theory focused on the information needs 
of the investment community (Williams & Ravenscroft, 2015). This rationale was successfully 
deployed by members of the FASB to reject the inclusion of stewardship as a separate objective 
of financial reporting (Pelger, 2016) whilst providing an impetus for the transformation of 
‘reliability’ to ‘faithful representation’ (Erb & Pelger, 2015; Power, 2010). Furthermore, it has 
been posited that the construction of the “rational economic actor” as the user of financial 
10 
 
statements allows accounting standard-setters to regard conduct that is at odds with financial 
economic theory as irrelevant (Young, 2006, p. 592). Although this suggests that accounting 
standard-setters have achieved a notable degree of success in mobilizing the precepts of 
financial economics, the outcome of such endeavors on accounting standards is uncertain 
(Himick & Brivot, 2018). This is particularly salient in the case of financial instruments, given 
the persistence of a mixed measurement model (Georgiou & Jack, 2011; Power, 2010). 
Nevertheless, our understanding of this partial application of financial economics is less 
developed. 
 
As one of the central tenets of financial economics, it may be expected that the EMH has 
significant implications in the domain of accounting standard-setting. The phrase ‘efficient 
market’ was first coined in 1965 by Eugene F. Fama to denote “a market where prices at every 
point in time represent best estimates of intrinsic values” (Fama, 1965, p. 94). While a 
substantial number of studies provide support for the EMH (e.g., Fama, 1970, 1998), its validity 
has been disputed (Basu, 1977; Dempsey, 2013; Fox, 2011; Mouck, 1998; Shiller, 1981, 2000). 
While Fama’s work would go on to win a Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2013 (Fama, 
2014), he shares this honor with two other economists including Robert J. Shiller (Nobel 
Foundation, 2013) who was paradoxically recognized for underscoring the inefficiency of 
markets (Shiller, 2014). Arguably, this emphasizes the suggestion put forth by Whitley (1986) 
that “[t]heoretical models of asset pricing in “efficient” markets are not so much concerned 
with how assets are actually priced … as with the nature of the equilibrium state if they were 
“perfect”” (p. 176). Nonetheless, the theory has demonstrated a remarkable degree of resilience 
(Hines, 1988b) particularly in light of the deficiencies highlighted during the global financial 
crisis (Ball, 2009; Gendron & Smith-Lacroix, 2015; McNicholas & Windsor, 2011; Moosa, 
2013; Soufian, Forbes, & Hudson, 2014). Consequently, irrespective of the actual 
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(in)efficiency of markets, the EMH remains one of the concepts that “dominate[s] the field of 
academic accounting as well as the field of accounting practice” (Cooper, 2015, p. 64).  
 
The role of the EMH may be discerned in the shift towards information-usefulness in 
accounting (Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009), forming part of the intellectual basis for the 
expansion of fair value accounting (Power, 2010). While fair value applies to a relatively small 
number of financial statement items under IFRS, it is often used to assist in the determination 
of initial capitalization amounts (Cairns, 2006; Nobes, 2015). In the context of loan assets to 
be measured at amortized cost, the presumed efficiency of loan pricing mechanisms may 
influence the design of impairment models. If loan pricing reflects all available information 
including an estimate of the probability of nonpayment (Beaver, Eger, Ryan, & Wolfson, 
1989), present values are only affected “when interest rates and expected losses change” (Laux, 
2012, p. 251). Consistent with this theory, the recognition of expected credit losses at the time 
of loan origination is regarded as ‘double-counting’ (Beaver et al., 1989). Nevertheless, while 
“IFRS are placing much more emphasis on the use of fair values to record transactions and to 
allocate the initial amount of transactions among its constituent parts” (Cairns, 2012, p. 23), 
our knowledge of the role of the EMH within these procedures is limited. We thus argue that 
the redesign of financial asset impairment methodology constitutes a fascinating site for the 
study of performativity, particularly considering the role of the EMH in this process and the 
significance of this endeavor as part of the IASB’s response to the global financial crisis. 
 
3. The performativity thesis and the translation of accounting standards 
 
In order to frame our study, we draw on two notions from actor-network theory (ANT); namely, 
Michel Callon’s work on the performativity of economic theories and the sociology of 
translation. Whilst the propensity of economic theories to shape the economy as opposed to 
merely observing it has been demonstrated in fields such as finance (Mackenzie, 2006; 
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MacKenzie, & Millo, 2003) and risk management (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009; Themsen & 
Skærbæk, 2018), our understanding of how economics co-performs accounting standards is 
relatively under-researched. Whilst on the surface the performativity thesis is seemingly 
equivalent to the presumption of the constitutive potential of accounting (Hopwood, 1983), 
Callon (1998b, 2007) emphasizes the predominance of economic theory, the necessity of 
examining the manner in which performativity transpires, and the instability of such effects. In 
doing so, Callon (1998a, 2007) underscores that accounting tools are central to the realization 
of the performativity of economics. In studying the performativity of the EMH in this case, we 
first examine how actors mobilize the theory during the standard-setting process; and second, 
we ascertain how this made a difference in the resulting accounting standard. 
 
One way in which economics becomes performative is by means of a process of purification. 
Tryggestad (2005) reports on one instance where the neo-classical production function 
participated in performing a manufacturing system by purifying it and adding legitimacy to the 
assumptions it relies on. MacKenzie (2006) on the other hand shows how a specific economic 
model used by practitioners was purified when Merton and Scholes were awarded the Nobel 
Prize in economics in 1997. However, we call attention to the experimental struggles 
(Christensen, Skærbæk, & Tryggestad, 2019) involved in enabling the performativity of 
abstract theories. According to Callon (2007), a heterogeneous network of “elements that have 
been carefully adjusted to one another” (p. 319) provides the framing in which theoretical 
statements have an opportunity to survive, albeit temporarily.  
 
Specifically, the operationalization of an economic theory involves socio-technical 
arrangements “endowed with the capacity of acting in different ways depending on their 
configuration” (Callon, 2007, p. 320). While this indicates that theories often face obstacles 
which hinder their ability to shape reality, it also signifies that theories do not act alone in 
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performing the world. Callon (2007) refers to the notion of co-performation in which he 
emphasizes the collective character of performativity. In this way, performativity involves a 
sense of tolerability that is not directed at economic theories in isolation, since “everyone does 
economics with different means” (Callon, 2007, p. 335). This suggests that ostensibly pure 
financial economic theories encompass an obligation on the part of instigating actors to 
translate them into networks – a process which may be expected to lead to transformations. 
 
In our case, economic theories, accounting standards and their issuing standard-setting bodies 
emerge as obligatory points of passage (Callon, 1986) for those who need to prepare an annual 
report or otherwise use it for different purposes. When utilized in accounting contexts, the 
notion of translation allows us to explore how networks succeed or fail; i.e., what contributes 
to their stability (Robson & Bottausci, 2017). Arguably, the model of translation put forward 
by Callon (1986), Callon and Latour (1981) and Callon et al. (2009) represents a useful 
mechanism to analyze these aspects in the context of a controversial convergence project 
between the IASB and the FASB. Translation is both a theory and an approach to study how 
programs of action are made possible. It is an approach that similar to the performativity thesis 
and most of Callon and Latour’s writings assumes a ‘free’ association between humans and 
non-humans. This implies that non-human actors, such as economic theories, have (equal) 
importance in being analyzed for what they do and implicate, an approach also adopted by 
Carruthers (2017) in referring to Hutchins (1995). In this way, Callon and other ANT theorists 
have drawn on Hutchins’ idea of how devices mediate human interactions by distributing 
cognitions, as human cognition is stimulated by external inputs called cognitive devices 
(Çalışkan & Callon, 2010; Callon, 1998b; Callon et al., 2009; Callon & Muniesa, 2005). 
 
In Callon’s early work (Callon, 1986) the translation model implies four moments of interest 
referred to as problematization, interessement, enrolment and mobilization. Problematization 
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involves the researcher identifying those instigators who seek to justify change by pointing out 
the problems that relate to an existing state of affairs. Having achieved support from the 
problematization, a project sets out to investigate alternative solutions to be experimented with 
and evaluated. This comprises of a reduction of the real world of lending practice to a series of 
in vitro experiments (Callon, 2009) within a standard-setting project. Firstly, the intricacies of 
the real-world are transported into the laboratory where they are transformed to produce a more 
manageable set of circumstances (Callon et al., 2009). This comprises of a “definition of the 
problem” as well as the arrangement of the necessary evidence (Mahama & Chua, 2016, p. 31) 
which may include the setting of objectives and the formation of expert groups.  
 
Nonetheless, in order to stabilize the project the research collective is required to “produce 
interest and get the adhesion of influential actors” (Callon et al., 2009, p. 61). This process of 
“interessement” aims to instill a sense of indispensability in regards to the solution devised by 
the research collective (Callon et al., 2009, p. 62). According to Callon (1986), “The range of 
possible strategies and mechanisms that are adopted to bring about these interruptions is 
unlimited” (p. 209). This extends beyond rhetorical strategies; it necessitates that a palpable 
connection is established between what was produced in the laboratory and the diverse outside 
world (Callon et al., 2009). At the stage of enrolment, stakeholders of the standard-setting 
process subject the possible implications of a proposed standard to a trial in which the extent 
to which actors tolerate the proposed configuration becomes discernable. In consideration of 
whether enrolment turns out satisfactorily due to the achievement of necessary compromises, 
a decision is made regarding whether to mobilize the network in order to start using the new 
standard, or to revert the solution to the laboratory for further experiments.  
 
We thus view accounting standard-setting as a collective process in which financial economic 
theories are translated due to associations forged within distinct networks. Accordingly, we 
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elaborate on the following question: How does financial economic theory co-perform with 




To accomplish this task, a combination of document analysis and interview data is relied upon. 
The documents used in the study predominantly encompass the relevant materials released by 
the IASB in relation to IFRS 9 Phase II. These documents were downloaded from the IASB 
website and read. Table 2 (appendix) details the documents utilized in the analysis. In addition 
to our analysis of the relevant documents produced by the IASB and the FASB, we analyze the 
683 comment letters submitted by constituents over four rounds of public consultation.1 This 
facilitated our ability to trace the key arguments employed by actors to shape the standard-
setting project. Subsequently, as part of a supplementary analysis of the comment letters, each 
letter was re-read and categorized according to the nature of the responding entity, its 
geographic location, and the degree of support expressed. In this way, we draw on a portion of 
the approach taken by McKee, Williams, and Frazier (1991) by classifying each comment letter 
as ‘Support’, ‘Oppose’, or ‘Undecidable’ with reference to the proposal under scrutiny which 
assists us in summarizing the relative stability of the various proposals. Tables 3–6 (appendix) 
illustrate the outcome of the supplemental comment letter analysis. 
 
Additionally, interviews with key actors in the European context were conducted. According 
to Patton (2015), although the triangulation of methods often produces dissimilar results, this 
may promote the strengthening of insights into the empirical domain. As Cooper and Robson 
(2006) note, researchers examining standard-setting processes should guard against an over-
reliance on formal documents due to the possibility that decisions may be enacted on an 
 
1 Comment letters cited in the analysis are prefaced with the abbreviation ‘CL’. 
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informal basis. Consequently, interviews are carried out not only to reinforce the scrutiny of 
publicly available information but also to further illuminate the activities surrounding the 
standard-setting project.  
 
A total of 22 interviews were conducted from March of 2014 to June of 2016 in five different 
countries; namely, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, and the U.K. The interviewees 
comprise of a wide range of individuals with either a direct involvement in the financial 
instruments project at the IASB, experience in the development of comment letters within this 
process or a specialization in financial instruments in accordance with IFRS. The interviews 
were semi-structured and centered on the relevant personal experiences and views of the 
interviewees. The interviews also served as a mechanism to corroborate the researchers’ 
understanding of the pertinent IASB documents and the comment letters submitted by the 
interviewee’s organization.2 Other than the interviewees who are currently or formerly 
associated with the IASB and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), 
generic descriptions representing the position and industry sector of the interviewees are 
outlined in Table 1. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, with the exception of two 
interviews in which notes were taken. All interviews were carried out in person, except for 
interviews 13 and 15 which were conducted by telephone. 
 
An underlying premise utilized in carrying out this research is “keep the analytic question mark 
firmly in view” (Woolgar & Lezaun, 2015, p. 465). This approach involves a commitment to 
“follow the actors themselves” (Latour, 2005, p. 12) which requires the researcher to engage 
with accounting standard-setters and constituents on pertinent and complex issues. 
Nevertheless, this research comprises of two interrelated limitations. First, the research 
 
2 The interview data gathered from individuals affiliated with the IASB and EFRAG represent their personal 
observations and should not be regarded as the official positions of these organizations. 
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commenced in early 2014 – several years after the inauguration of the IASB’s financial asset 
impairment project in 2009. Second, although four relevant members of the IASB staff were 
interviewed, these individuals were not employed by the IASB for the entire duration of the 
standard-setting project. 
Table 1: Interview list 
 
 
5. The efficient market hypothesis and the translation of the IASB’s expected credit 
loss model 
 
This section includes our empirical analysis. It commences with the problematization of the 
need for change during the global financial crisis and then proceeds to analyze three translations 
comprising of the interrelated attempts of the IASB to construct an expected credit loss model 
as the solution to the problem pointed out. In conjunction with a number of other forces, we 
Interviewee Employment sector / Position Date Duration (min.)
1 EFRAG Board Member 28 March 2014 85
2 EFRAG Board Member 23 November 2014 94
3 Accountant, Information Technology sector 31 October 2014 55
4 Accountant, Banking industry representative group 19 November 2014 41
5a Accountant, Banking industry representative group 19 November 2014 42
5b Accountant, Banking industry representative group 19 November 2014 42
6 EFRAG TEG Member (former) 19 November 2014 76
7 Partner, Big Four accounting firm 24 November 2014 34
8 Partner, Big Four accounting firm 19 December 2014 42
9 IASB Staff 6 March 2015 23
10 IASB Staff 6 March 2015 41
11 IASB Staff 6 March 2015 54
12 Accountant, Banking industry representative group 9 July 2015 78
13 EFRAG TEG Member 14 July 2015 47
14 Accountant, Accounting professional association 23 July 2015 50
15 Accountant, Banking industry representative group 6 August 2015 38
16 IASB Staff (former) 28 September 2015 75
17 Accountant, Financial services industry 7 March 2016 65
18 Partner, Big Four accounting firm 24 May 2016 49
19 Accountant, Insurance industry representative group 24 May 2016 54
20 Accountant, Financial services industry 25 May 2016 65
21 Accountant, Financial services industry 1 June 2016 38
22a Accountant, Government agency 13 June 2016 43
22b Accountant, Government agency 13 June 2016 43
18 
 
illustrate how the EMH played an important role in the translations by forming the basis for 
the IASB’s overall objective for the project to reflect the presumed linkage between loan 
pricing and initial expected credit losses. 
 
5.1 Problematization: The global financial crisis and the request for revised standards on 
loan loss provisioning 
 
The approach to loan loss provisioning included within IAS 39 Financial Instruments was 
initially released in 1998 by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the 
predecessor organization to the IASB (IFRS Foundation, 2016). In addition to the time pressure 
it faced in submitting its standards to IOSCO in 1998 (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007; Zeff, 2012) 
and the European Union in time for the 2005 adoption of IFRS (Whittington, 2005), the IASB’s 
decision to publish what is now referred to as an incurred loss approach to impairment was 
largely based on a desire not to significantly deviate from U.S. GAAP (Camfferman, 2015; 
Walton, 2004). At the time of its development, concerns raised in the U.S. over the potential 
for earnings management associated with an expected credit loss approach lent further credence 
to the incurred loss approach (Camfferman, 2015). According to former IASB Chairman Sir 
David Tweedie, the incurred loss model was predicated on a desire to reflect the economics of 
lending whilst curbing the potential for manipulation.  
 
The whole idea of the model we have at the moment, the incurred loss model, is to stop people 
whacking in a big bath provision in good times and feeding it back in the bad times, so you just 
lose the reality of the actual economics in the two years – the one where the big provision goes 
through and the second one where it comes back in. We are simply trying to show what actually 
happens and then explain it (Tweedie, 2012). 
 
The incurred loss approach in IAS 39 stipulates that impairments be grounded on the 
observance of a loss event. IAS 39 considers impairment losses to be ‘incurred’ “if, and only 
if, there is objective evidence of impairment as a result of one or more events that occurred 
after the initial recognition of the asset” (IASB, 2008a, p. 2045). Particularly, IAS 39 prohibits 
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the immediate recognition of credit losses since this would be inconsistent with the requirement 
to initially measure financial assets at fair value. This consideration of fair value at the point of 
loan origination presumes that loan pricing incorporates initial expectations of credit losses 
which is consistent with the EMH.3 Moreover, under IAS 39, impairment losses cannot be 
based on anticipated future events. Taken together, the incurred loss model generally defers the 
recognition of loan losses in comparison with expected loss approaches (IASB, 2013a). 
 
At the advent of the global financial crisis, numerous actors problematized the criteria for the 
recognition of impairment losses on financial assets for exacerbating the calamity. This was 
known as the problem of “too little too late” associated with incurred loss models (European 
Union, 2015, p. 9). Such concerns were pronounced by prominent groups such as the G20, the 
Financial Stability Forum (currently the Financial Stability Board), and the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) who called for more ‘forward-looking’ approaches to 
impairment. This constituted part of a wider objective to reform the financial architecture of 
the global economy to promote greater financial stability in an era in which economists were 
criticized for their inability to foresee the crisis (Desai, 2015). In an accounting context, the 
controversy was initially grounded on the notion of ‘procyclicality’ which suggests that 
“Certain aspects of accounting frameworks and capital regulation tend to enhance the natural 
tendency of the financial system to amplify business cycles, affecting both the degree of credit 
expansion in benign conditions and the degree of credit contraction in the downturn” (G20 
Working Group 1, 2009, p. v). 
 
Accordingly, the incurred loss approach was labelled as untenable amid calls for reform. In 
particular, reports criticized the model by proclaiming that an “Earlier recognition of loan 
 
3 The presumption that fair values incorporate initial expected credit losses is implied by the following 
description in the Implementation Guidance on IAS 39: “For a loan asset, the fair value is the amount of cash 
lent adjusted for any fees and costs (unless a portion of the amount lent is compensation for other stated or 
implied rights or privileges)” (IASB, 2010c, p. 2269). 
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losses could have dampened cyclical moves in the current crisis” (FSF, 2009a, p. 4). Along 
these lines, it was declared that a lesson learned from the crisis is that loan losses in financial 
reporting must be recognized earlier (BCBS, 2009). The matter was specifically addressed at 
the G20 London Summit on the 2nd of April 2009. This resulted in an official declaration of 
support for the suggestions put forward by the Financial Stability Forum while calling on 
accounting standard-setters to achieve convergence and “strengthen accounting recognition of 
loan-loss provisions by incorporating a broader range of credit information” (G20, 2009, p. 5). 
Moreover, an advisory group established to council the IASB and the FASB on their response 
to the crisis urged the development of a more ‘forward-looking’ approach to financial asset 
impairment (Financial Crisis Advisory Group, 2009). Nevertheless, the dynamics between the 
prudential objective of reducing procyclicality and the standard-setters’ objective to faithfully 
represent economic reality sets the stage for a standard-setting process fraught with tension.  
 
[T]he FSB, BCBS, and CGFS, working with accounting standard setters, should take forward, 
with a deadline of end 2009, implementation of the recommendations published today to 
mitigate procyclicality, including a requirement for banks to build buffers of resources in good 
times that they can draw down when conditions deteriorate (G20, 2009, p. 2). 
 
This statement from a G20 Leaders’ Statement points to the possibility that an objective of 
dampening procyclicality may conflict with the objectives of standard-setters. This occurs to 
the extent that the construction of ‘buffers’ is deemed not to faithfully represent economic 
reality based on a presumption of the efficiency of loan pricing in taking initial expected losses 
into account. In addition to the potential incompatibility of objectives, the proposed solutions 
to the deficiencies of the extant model introduce an array of operational difficulties (e.g., 
Deloitte, 2014; Ernst & Young, 2012; KPMG, 2015; PWC, 2014). This included the extension 
of requirements to forecast future economic conditions (IFRS Foundation, 2015) which is 




The following sections retrace the process in which the IASB constructed the expected credit 
loss model over a six-year period comprising of three translations. The first translation 
commences in 2009 with a Request for Information (IASB, 2009a) and an Exposure Draft 
(IASB, 2009c). In translation two, the IASB embarked on a convergence project with the FASB 
leading to the publication of a Supplementary Document in 2011 (IASB, 2011). Nevertheless, 
the FASB exited the convergence project in 2012 (FASB, 2012a). This led to a third translation 
process surrounding the IASB’s 2013 Exposure Draft (IASB, 2013a) which culminated in a 
state of provisional stability. Figure 1 provides a timeline of significant events. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of events 
 
 
5.2 Translation 1: The intolerability of the EMH-inspired ideal-type model 
 
In the backdrop of the problematization of the incurred loss impairment model, the IASB board 
met in London from the 17th to the 21st of November 2008 where it formally added a Financial 
Instruments project on recognition and measurement to its agenda (IASB, 2008b). From the 
outset, the IASB staff stipulated its presumption that the initial pricing of loan assets “includes 
a component that compensates the lender for expected losses” (IASB Staff Paper, 2009b, p. 9). 
This is consistent with the EMH-inspired notion of an efficient loan pricing mechanism as it 
“assumes a market in which the lenders can pass on expected losses as a component of the 




Subsequently, the IASB issued a Request for Information on 25 June 2009 on the feasibility of 
an expected loss model (IASB, 2009a). The model put forth in the document departs from IAS 
39 by eliminating the need for an observable loss event prior to the recognition of provisions 
while basing interest revenue on the cash flows expected to be received (IASB, 2009a, p. 3). 
Effectively, this approach expands the calculation of expected cash flows to include each 
individual loan asset, discounted at its effective interest rate at origination. However, similar 
to its treatment under the incurred loss approach, the board decided to preclude the immediate 
recognition of credit losses because of its presumption in the efficiency of loan pricing whereby 
“expected losses are implicit in the initial measurement of the asset” (IASB, 2009a, p. 2). Thus, 
the proposed formulation aims to produce a more forward-looking model as called for by the 
G20 by enhancing the information needs of capital providers whilst maintaining the fair value 
presumption of the embeddedness of initial expected credit losses in loan pricing. At this point, 
the IASB sought feedback from its constituents which included financial statement users, 
preparers and auditors, along with groups such as the G20, the Financial Stability Board, the 













Figure 2: The Translation 1-Network 
 
 
In response to the request, a total of 88 comment letters were received by the IASB (see Table 
3, appendix) in which “a large majority of respondents” noted substantial challenges with 
respect to operationalizing the model (IASB Staff Paper, 2009a, p. 3). Constituents anticipated 
major difficulties associated with a substantial increase in forecasting length (IASB Staff Paper, 
2009a, p. 7) along with expectations of “very significant” implementation costs (IASB Staff 
Paper, 2009a, p. 9), casting doubt on the feasibility of the expected cash flow model. 
 
5.2.1 Justifying the ideal-type model and defining the network 
 
The IASB board met in September 2009 to discuss the feedback to its Request for Information 
and commence the development of an Exposure Draft on the impairment of financial 
instruments (IASB, 2009b). In this meeting, the IASB staff recommended the formation of an 
Expert Advisory Panel (EAP) to aid in the operational aspects of the model along with 
reaffirming its prohibition on the recognition of initial expected losses (IASB Staff Paper, 
2009c) which was ratified by the board (IASB, 2009b). Reiterating its position on the efficiency 
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recognizing such losses “would usually result in a non-faithful representation” since “there is 
no economic loss if the expected losses are reflected in (and covered by) the margin (pricing) 
on the instrument” (IASB Staff Paper, 2009c, p. 8). Shortly afterwards, in November of 2009, 
the IASB issued the Exposure Draft Amortised Cost and Impairment (IASB, 2009c). 
 
In defining the pertinent actors to be enrolled in the network and program solution, the IASB 
outlines the concerns of various groups and what they desire. At this point, it is acknowledged 
by the standard-setter that the commencement of the project has been precipitated by feedback 
obtained from the G20 and the Financial Stability Board while users are defined as necessarily 
interested in evaluating an entity’s credit risk (IASB, 2009c). Although the IASB has broadly 
defined the identities of pertinent actors, it is during the moment of interessement that it 
attempts to stabilize the role of these entities within the proposed formulation. While the IASB 
aims to enroll the G20 and the Financial Stability Board through the development of a more 
forward-looking model, it attempts to demarcate the goals of reducing procyclicality and 
reflecting the economic reality of lending. Accordingly, the board states that an essential 
characteristic of the information provided by the model is that “it must be neutral and portray 
the economic characteristics of the recognised financial assets” (IASB, 2009d, p. 9). Along 
these lines, the IASB draws on the notion of market pricing from financial economics which 
presumes that “expected losses are implicit in the initial measurement of the asset” (IASB, 
2009a, 2). According to the IASB, this approach “faithfully represents the underlying 
economics included in the pricing of financial instruments” (IASB, 2011, p. 41). This sentiment 
was also reiterated by a number of interviewees. A former member of the IASB staff 
emphasizes that “[the 2009 version of the] model was theoretically and business wise, in many 
ways, the right model” (Interviewee 16). The following statement from an interviewee – an 
accountant based in the financial services industry – suggests that the proposed model rightly 




You could say [the initial expected loss] is included in the pricing or you could say it is the 
general accounting concept that you recognize things at their initial fair value. If I’m perfectly 
happy to issue this loan at its current fair value, why should I immediately say it’s worth less 
than its initial value? (Interviewee 21) 
 
Furthermore, a Partner in a Big 4 Audit firm states that the presumption that the pricing of 
financial assets includes initial expectations of losses is grounded in actual lending practices. 
 
If you advance somebody a loan on arms-length terms and with a specified interest rate, that 
level of interest rate has been negotiated in a way that the bank making the loan would expect 
to recover, on average, interest income that would more than compensate it for the level of 
credit losses it would expect to incur. It ties back to notions of market pricing. (Interviewee 18) 
 
Nevertheless, the Exposure Draft maintains many of the main characteristics of the expected 
credit loss model outlined earlier in the year which an overwhelming majority of preparers and 
audit firms regarded as unworkable. In doing so, the IASB casts doubt on the concerns voiced 
by preparers regarding the challenges involved in estimating amounts (IASB, 2009d).  
 
5.2.2 Further testing of the ideal-type model for enrolment 
 
During the first half of 2010, public comments to the exposure draft were submitted by 
constituents in the form of 194 comment letters (see Table 4, appendix). Several respondents 
favored an expected loss impairment methodology as it “better reflects the economics of a 
lending transaction than an incurred loss impairment approach” (IASB Staff Paper, 2010c, p. 
3). However, financial statement users did not uniformly concur with the proposed approach’s 
depiction of the economics of lending. While the Corporate Reporting Users’ Forum (CL 
CFUF, 2010) concurs that “Expected losses are priced, implicitly or explicitly, into loans” (p. 
2), the CFA Institute (CL 2010) disputes the accuracy of the model in periods subsequent to 
inception due to its preference for a fair value approach. Moreover, concerns regarding the 
effect of the model on procyclicality persisted (IASB Staff Paper, 2010c). This reflects a belief 
that “the [Expected Loss] approach proposed in the [Exposure Draft] might result in an 
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allowance account whose balance is not adequate at all times to cover the expected credit losses 
in a portfolio of financial assets measured at amortised cost” (CL BCBS, 2010, p. 1). 
Accordingly, a letter submitted by the European Commission (CL 2010) emphasizes that 
“considerations of financial stability should be further strengthened, mitigating as much as 
possible the pro-cyclical nature of the current rules on loan loss provisioning” (p. 1). Due to 
the prohibition of immediate losses, it is alleged that the proposal fails to adequately address 
the problem of “too little too late” (CL HSBC, 2010, p. 2). 
 
Furthermore, the feasibility of the proposal was called into question by a majority of 
respondents. For instance, the desire for convergence (CL Deloitte, 2010; CL EY, 2010; CL 
Grant Thornton, 2010; CL KPMG, 2010) as well as the difficulties involved in verification (CL 
Deloitte, 2010; CL KPMG, 2010) and implementation (CL Deloitte, 2010; CL EY, 2010; CL 
Grant Thornton, 2010; CL KPMG, 2010; CL Mazars, 2010; CL PWC, 2010) contributed to an 
absence of enrolment within the audit community. The inoperability of the proposal was also 
stressed by several interviewees. For example, an accountant representing a group of European 
banks insists that while the proposed model has theoretical merits, its application in practice 
would not have been feasible: “The expected cash flow model from a theoretical view is a very 
good model, but because of the operational difficulties there was no real [possibility that it 
could be] implemented by banks (Interviewee 4).” This was reiterated by a member of EFRAG: 
“The problem with their initial proposal was that you should make an estimate for each, single 
loan when the expected loss was expected to occur, and that is actually completely impossible 
in fact” (Interviewee 13). 
 
It may be observed in Tables 3 and 4 (appendix) that opposition to the ideal-type approach was 
remarkably widespread. Although the approach was far more ‘forward-looking’ in comparison 
with the incurred loss model, the IASB’s efforts to stabilize the standard-setting network were 
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largely guided by a presumption that loan pricing mechanisms efficiency incorporate initial 
expected losses. While this idealized approach attempts to ‘faithfully represent’ the underlying 
economics of lending, it principally involved interessement mechanisms at the hypothetical 
level of the general-purpose financial statement user. Ultimately, the proposal was broadly 
regarded as intolerable because of the reality it was expected to produce for actors. First, a lack 
of enrolment has been observed on the part of financial statement users such as the CFA 
Institute who prefer a converged approach based on fair value. Second, the regulatory 
community stood in opposition to the proposal which it deemed as insufficiently forward-
looking to help prevent future crises. Third, as reiterated by the EAP and a number of 
interviewees, most banks rejected the proposal over serious concerns regarding its practical 
implementation which was echoed by several significant audit firms. Crucially, the latter point 
signifies that there are important limits to the application of models inspired by financial 
economics in accounting standards. Even when such models are widely considered as ‘ideal’ 
solutions, they may be deemed as intolerable in practice. As observed in this translation, 
preparers, auditors and expert groups possess a capacity to halt the advancement of ‘ideal-type’ 
approaches by convincing standard-setters of the reality of their unworkability.  
 
At this point, the task ahead involved the seemingly unattainable translation of the IASB’s 
idealized objective in consideration of various operational and regulatory matters of concern. 
Nevertheless, the complexity of the initiative was set to further intensify with the inclusion of 
the FASB and its constituents. 
  
5.3 Translation 2: The intolerable IASB–FASB joint model 
 
In consideration of the IASB’s commitment to the convergence of financial asset impairment 
models (IASB, 2009c), its initial reconstruction efforts in 2009 represent an exploratory 
process to form the basis for subsequent discussions with the FASB. Prior to the joint 
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deliberations, however, the IASB met in July and August 2010 to contemplate how to react to 
the feedback received thus far (IASB Staff Paper, 2010a). At its meeting in September of 2010, 
an IASB Staff Paper (2010b) reiterates the staff’s position on the efficiency of loan pricing by 
stating that “the pricing of a financial asset inherently includes some estimate for initial 
[expected loss]” (p. 5). Accordingly, in this board meeting the IASB retained its position on 
the allocation of initial expected credit losses over the life of the asset as opposed to recognizing 
the entire loss in the initial period (IASB, 2010a). In contrast, the initial direction taken by the 
FASB constitutes a drastically dissimilar reduction of the world of lending practice. The 
objective of the initial approach developed by the FASB is “to ensure that the allowance 
balance was sufficient to cover all estimated credit losses for the remaining life of an 
instrument” (IASB, 2011, p. 6). This resulted in the FASB model recognizing losses at 
inception that are based on initial expectations of cash shortfalls (IASB, 2011). This diverges 
from the IASB’s objective which regards the recognition of losses at inception to be counter-
intuitive. In comparison, the FASB’s objective contains an added degree of concern for the 
exacerbation of negative economic consequences at the onset of financial crises.  
 
The FASB proposed this approach because the FASB believed it resolved the concern with 
respect to the current guidance on impairment that reserves tend to be at their lowest level when 
they are most needed at the beginning of a downward-trending economic cycle (the ‘too little, 
too late’ concern) (IASB, 2011, p. 6).  
 
5.3.1   The work of the IASB–FASB joint project group  
 
Whilst the joint project aims to satisfy the request of the G20 for a converged model, from the 
perspective of the IASB the joint effort mobilizes a range of additional actors and their 
associated matters of concern within the standard-setting network (see Figure 3). This led the 
joint IASB–FASB proposal on impairment in the 2011 Supplementary Document (IASB, 




We learnt that in practice, the [Expected Cash Flow] approach would give rise to operational 
difficulties because financial institutions and others typically store comprehensive contractual 
and accounting data (in particular effective interest rate data) and [Expected Loss] data 
information in separate systems (‘accounting’ and ‘risk’ systems) (EAP, 2010, p. 6).  
 
Along these lines, the EAP introduced a major operational simplification in recommending the 
decoupling of expected losses from the calculation of the effective interest rate. As a result, the 
joint approach proposes that credit losses on financial assets in the ‘good books’ be recorded 
at the higher of the time-proportional losses and the losses expected to occur in the foreseeable 
future – known as the ‘floor’ requirement – while full lifetime expected credit losses are to be 
recognized on financial assets in the ‘bad books’ (IASB, 2011). Whilst the time-proportional 
element attends to the IASB’s objective of reflecting the efficiency of loan pricing at inception, 
the floor addresses the FASB’s concern with the adequacy of the allowance balance. In doing 
so, the boards “reflected the primary objectives of both boards” (IASB, 2011, p. 49).  
 
Figure 3: The Translation 2-Network 
 
 
5.3.2 The testing of convergence efforts 
 
In response to the Supplementary Document, a total of 212 comment letters were received from 
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Supplementary Document appreciate the operational simplifications relative to the previous 
version (IASB Staff Paper, 2011a), opposition to the proposal remains prevalent. Firstly, bank 
regulators underscoring the primacy of maintaining a sufficient level of provisions expressed 
different positions on whether the model goes far enough in achieving this objective. For 
example, the response of the BCBS (CL 2011) “welcomes the approach in the Impairment 
supplement as it could promote more forward-looking provisioning” (p. 4) while the U.S. based 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (CL 2011) states that “the Agencies are concerned 
about the potential deferral of credit losses if a reasonable floor is not mandated” (p. 2-3). 
 
Furthermore, the proposed model was largely unable to gather support from users and other 
actors concerned with the model’s depiction of economic reality. For instance, the CFA 
Institute (CL 2011) proclaims that “we do not believe that this model reflects the underlying 
economics” because “we do not find any empirical evidence which demonstrates that the 
proposed model would reflect the pattern of how credit losses emerge” (p. 2). The matter of 
how expected credit losses would be recognized in the ‘good books’ was a particularly 
contentious issue (IASB Staff Paper, 2011a). Specifically, the inclusion of the ‘floor’ is 
regarded as inappropriate by proponents of the IASB’s objective of reflecting the underlying 
economics of lending. For example, Barclays (CL 2011) does not concur with the addition of 
a foreseeable future floor “which relates primarily to a prudential regulatory objective”. Other 
respondents such as EFRAG (CL 2011) stress the necessity to clarify the meaning of 
‘foreseeable future’ whilst recommending that this be established as a twelve-month horizon. 
Indeed, the principles-based notion of ‘foreseeable future’ was generally regarded as 
inappropriately contributing to diversity in practice in the majority of comment letters 
submitted by audit firms (CL Deloitte, 2011; CL EY, 2011; CL KPMG, 2011; CL MAZARS, 




Overall, the consultation revealed “strong geographic leanings” (IASB Staff Paper, 2011a, p. 
11) as a majority of non-U.S. preparers expressed a penchant for the time-proportional 
approach whilst most U.S. preparers favored the foreseeable future method (IASB Staff Paper, 
2011b). Proponents of the time-proportional approach supported the IASB’s objective to depict 
the connection between loan pricing and initial expected credit losses as “They believe that 
establishing an adequate allowance balance is a regulatory concern and that a ‘day-one loss’ 
is inconsistent with the economics of lending at market rates” (IASB Staff Paper, 2011a, p. 11). 
This illustrates a link between the adherence to the notion of efficient loan pricing mechanisms 
and the capacity of the proposed approach to depict economic reality. Conversely, respondents 
backing the foreseeable future approach tended to concur with the FASB’s objective of 
safeguarding the level of provisions (IASB Staff Paper, 2011a).  
 
Consequently, it has been observed that two boards were unable to enroll significant actors 
from the regulatory, audit, and user communities to the proposed formulation, and the FASB 
disclosed that its constituents maintained substantial concerns regarding the “understandability, 
operability, and auditability” of the joint approach (FASB, 2012d, p. 5). Subsequently, the 
FASB board voted unanimously to pursue a different methodology (FASB, 2012a) that would 
establish a provision for all expected credit losses on financial assets (FASB, 2012b). In this 
way, the FASB casts doubt on its ability to link loan pricing and initial expected credit losses. 
 
[W]hile the credit spread charged on the lender’s overall portfolio of individual loans may be 
expected to compensate the entity for credit losses for a large portfolio of assets over time, the 
credit spread on any individual loan is not established in a way to necessarily compensate the 
lender for credit losses on that individual asset. As a result, the Board believes that it is 
impractical to link accurately the recognition of credit losses anticipated at origination or 
acquisition with the compensation paid to the lender (interest) for undertaking that risk. (FASB, 
2012c, p. 138) 
 
Data gathered from interviews highlight the reasons for the failure of the joint initiative. As 
stated by one interviewee, who was an IASB Board Member at the time of the joint project, 
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the boards faced considerable challenges in forming a converged approach that would be 
tolerated by their constituencies. 
 
In one of my more emotional than logical appeals to the board, I said “Have we not spent two 
years together with the Americans on this? Isn’t it time for us to stop this arguing and decide?” 
But that was impossible. There were so many grand opinions and some of the Americans said 
“No, it should be upfront reservations.” Others said “We need to stay with this theoretical 
model.” That was a very, very tiresome process. I even said “If we can’t do this we should let 
the G20’s finance minister take over this responsibility.” It doesn’t make you more popular but 
sometimes you have to say what you think. (Interviewee 16) 
 
The existence of these seemingly irreconcilable views points to the difficulty involved in 
satisfying the G20’s request for a converged approach. However, according to a number of 
interviewees, the failure is also partly grounded in discrepancies surrounding how capital is 
raised, the duration of loans and prudential regulation in the U.S. and Europe.  
 
In the U.S. capital is mostly provided by markets, while in Europe it is mostly provided by 
banks. As a consequence of that, the average banking book maturity in Europe is 7-10 years 
while in the U.S. it’s 3-4 years. With that maturity [in the U.S.], it may be better to take the 
lifetime expected losses up front instead of taking 12-months and then moving to bucket two. 
(Interviewee 14) 
 
In Europe, the securitization market is not that well developed as in the U.S. and most banks 
actually hold their portfolios until maturity. (Interviewee 13) 
 
Consequently, according to another interviewee – an accountant in a bank representative group 
in Europe – the disparity in lending environments influences the measurability of lifetime 
expected credit losses and profitability. 
 
You have to be aware that in Europe we grant credit for a long time, for example, twenty or 
thirty years. In the U.S. you just grant credit for about five years, for a shorter period where it 
is easier of course to calculate the lifetime expected loss because there are just five years. But 
it’s very difficult to calculate a lifetime expected loss for the next thirty years. And then the 
second problem, it’s not just the calculation, but also then when you have to calculate you have 
the P&L impact, and the P&L impact for thirty years is much bigger than just for five years and 




In addition, the relationship between the financial reporting requirements for the impairment 
of financial assets and the level of bank reserves has been highlighted by several interviewees. 
This points to an incongruence in the objectives of prudential regulators on the matter.   
 
We have the feeling that some have more ‘reserves’ than others … American banks would have 
to release reserves if they change over to the IASB model. But then the IASB is in the position 
of many companies not having those reserves and having longer-running financial instruments. 
(Interviewee 6).  
 
Analogous to a “politically unacceptable” decrease in the level of reserves in the U.S. 
(Interviewee 15), the “bad consequences for Europe” (Interviewee 15) of a large increase in 
reserve levels is also pointed out by an interviewee representing a European banking group.  
 
The reserves in the U.S. are much higher compared to European banks, so that’s the starting 
point of this. It’s a very important starting point. The European banks in some countries, major 
banks, are not in a position to move to the FASB model because if they were obliged to do that, 
it would not be possible for them to take it. They might have to go into liquidation or into 
bankruptcy. Their reserves would have to increase so much that their equity would be nil or 
even negative (Interviewee 12).  
 
Thus, as encapsulated by a member of the IASB staff, the prudential regulatory environments 
in the U.S. and Europe played a significant role in the failure of the convergence project. From 
the standpoint of this interviewee, this development came at the expense of accurately depicting 
the underlying economics of lending in the U.S.  
 
I think the reason you have a difference is much more due to the regulatory environment. 
Basically the US regulators are pushing harder to get capital into the banks, in this respect at 
least. They have seen this as one mechanism for doing so. There’s no logic as to why you should 
recognize full lifetime expected losses on Day 1. There’s no economic justification for it. But 
what the [U.S.] regulators didn’t want would be a situation where impairment or loss 
allowances would actually be going down when the new standard came out, potentially. 
(Interviewee 10)  
 
In this translation, the theory of efficient loan pricing at inception is utilized as a tool to discredit 
the conceptual merit of the FASB approach. Outreach activities carried out by the IASB 
revealed that, in general, “IFRS constituents favor a model that focuses on presenting 
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information that shows that the pricing of financial assets is linked to expected loss estimates” 
(IASB Staff Paper, 2011b, p. 3). Accordingly, non U.S.-based actors largely regarded the 
‘Good Book, Bad Book’ model as an undue departure from the economics of lending due to 
the recognition of excessive up-front credit losses. In addition to the ‘foreseeable future floor’ 
being regarded as an inappropriate ‘buffer’ to alleviate the strain of future financial crises, the 
operationalization of the model was deemed as overly complex in terms of its requirement for 
two separate calculations in the ‘good book’ coupled with a lack of alignment with Basel 
provisioning rules. This demonstrates not only a dissimilar utilization of financial economic 
theory on the part of the IASB and the FASB, but also a different configuration of concerns 
which in totality produced an intolerable compromise on both ends. The intolerability of the 
joint approach may also be discerned in Table 5 (appendix) which depicts the geographically 
broad opposition from a wide-range of respondents. As such, the IASB proceeded to further 
experiment with its own model based on outreach with its constituents (IASB, 2012a). 
 
5.4 Translation 3: Further IASB experimentation and provisional tolerability 
 
I think the model we developed is, in terms of principles, the best one to serve both the investor 
community and the preparer community … As for the regulators, in some countries they might 
find this perfect because of the macroeconomics, in others they might find that they need to 
complement or make adjustments, but this is life. (Interviewee 11) 
 
The quote above from an IASB staff member deeply involved in the project depicts the 
provisionally stable outcome of the project in which the IASB endeavored to link its EMH-
inspired objective with other matters of concern. The outcome of these experiments resulted in 
the IASB’s 2013 version of the model which maintains the board’s conviction that “the initial 
expectations of credit losses are priced into financial assets both when they are originated and 
when they are purchased” (IASB, 2013a, p. 7). In addition to this standpoint, the 2013 model 
was designed in such a way as to render it tolerable in the eyes of prominent constituents (see 
Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: The Translation 3-Network 
 
 
5.4.1   Compromises to secure enrolment 
 
This version of the model reduces the deterioration of loan assets into three successive stages. 
Upon the purchase of a financial asset, it enters the first stage in which “12-month expected 
credit losses are recognised” (IASB, 2013a, p. 6). The asset reaches Stage 2 if it has 
“deteriorated significantly in credit quality since initial recognition” (IASB, 2013a, p. 6) 
whereby lifetime expected credit losses are recorded. A similar treatment of lifetime expected 
credit losses is conducted in Stage 3 for “assets that have objective evidence of impairment at 
the reporting date” (IASB, 2013a, p. 6). However, while interest revenue is calculated based 
on the asset’s gross carrying amount in Stages 1 and 2, in Stage 3 “interest revenue is calculated 
on the net carrying amount (i.e., reduced for expected credit losses)” (IASB, 2013a, p. 6). 
Moreover, to address the operational anxieties of model outlined in the 2011 Supplementary 
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elimination of the foreseeable future floor thus removes a significant operational concern along 
with the subjectivity involved in interpreting the meaning of ‘foreseeable’ (IASB, 2013a).  
 
At its December 2012 board meeting, the IASB decided that its financial asset impairment 
methodology should be re-exposed for comment (IASB, 2012b). The exposure draft was 
published in March of 2013 leading to the receipt of 189 comment letters (see Table 6, 
appendix). Some respondents revealed a lingering concern over the adequacy of the revised 
model in addressing the matter of procyclicality (e.g., CL BCBS, 2013; CL ING, 2013; CL 
Standard Chartered, 2013). For instance, the BCBS (CL 2013) recommends that the Stage 1 
horizon of 12-months “would result in allowances not building sufficiently before a payment 
default occurs” (p. 5). Furthermore, a concern over the insufficiency of interpretation guidance 
was voiced by some constituents (IASB Staff Paper, 2013). For example, the European 
Banking Federation calls for additional clarification of the proposed model (CL EBF, 2013) 
while EY (CL 2013) asserts that “interpretation issues will result in considerable diversity of 
application that is best avoided by the issue of further guidance” (p. 2). This included calls 
from the audit community to clarify how assets are transferred from Stage 1 to Stage 2 (CL 
EY, 2013; CL Mazars, 2013; CL PWC, 2013). Overall, however, there was a general sense that 
the IASB had struck a workable compromise.  
 
The vast majority of respondents support the proposals in the [Exposure Draft] as an appropriate 
balance between faithful representation of credit losses on financial instruments, and the costs 
of producing that information. Most specified that they agree with the IASB that initial credit 
loss expectations are priced into assets when originated or purchased, and continue to support 
an approach that considers deterioration in credit quality in deciding the extent to which 
expected credit losses should be recognised. (IASB Staff Paper, 2013, p. 3) 
 
In general terms, the responses to the Exposure Draft revealed the considerable alliances 
formed with prominent actors. For example, EFRAG (CL 2013) characterizes the approach as 
a “reasonable proxy” of the 2009 model and believes that “in the absence of a better model … 
it is time that the IASB should finalise its impairment requirements” (p. 1) subsequent to 
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relatively minor revisions. Interview material from a Big 4 audit partner also reveals that 
although the 2013 version of the model may not have been ideal, it constitutes a tolerable 
compromise that needed to be rendered as a response to the financial crisis. 
 
It’s been a huge issue about whether impairment was coming too late, whether the current 
impairment loss model didn’t capture the things that we’ve seen which stands clear when you 
look in the back mirror. So I think we have also accepted that you need to do something, and 
where they ended up now is probably not the best, perfect solution but it’s also not so bad that 
we can see this as a good compromise. (Interviewee 7)  
 
Consequently, at the IASB’s January 2014 board meeting, “clarifications and enhancements” 
to its 2013 exposure draft were finalized (IASB, 2014a, p. 6) and the model was published in 
July of 2014 as part of IFRS 9: Financial Instruments (IASB, 2014b). To a large extent, the 
workability of the IASB’s eventual expected credit loss model was achieved through the 
formation of the 12-month expected credit loss requirement for loans in Stage 1. From the 
perspective of the IASB, “the recognition of 12-month expected credit losses is a pragmatic 
solution to achieve a balance between faithfully representing the underlying economics of a 
transaction” – which would preclude credit losses in Stage 1 – and “the cost of implementation” 
(IASB, 2014c, p. 133). The 12-month window has also been observed to partially align with 
existing regulatory requirements.  
 
All firms, big and small, have to calculate their regulatory capital on a 12-month expected loss 
basis. The regulatory measure of expected loss is not the same as the accounting measure of 
expected loss but at least they have the components in place. (Interviewee 20) 
 
People are already calculating 12-month expected loss. Why don’t you use that as the 
mechanism to defer some revenue? So you recognize a loss on every loan you issue but it’s not 
the lifetime loss it’s just the 12-month loss essentially based on stuff you’re already doing now. 
(Interviewee 21) 
 
Whilst the above mechanisms of interessement aim to facilitate the enrolment of preparers, 
auditors, and prudential regulators, the model’s representation of economic reality remains an 
important matter of concern. The IASB’s justification for not recognizing lifetime expected 
credit losses in Stage 1 is explained in reference to its presumption regarding the association 
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between the purchase price and initial expectations of credit losses. The consequence of this 
would purportedly include “the double-counting of expected credit losses that are priced into a 
financial asset” and “a loss of information about the changes in credit quality” (IASB, 2013b, 
p. 13). Whilst the IASB believes that its core principle of depicting the economics of lending 
is maintained in the 2013 edition of the model, it concedes that this would have been best 
reflected by the approach taken in its 2009 Exposure Draft. 
 
In the IASB’s view, expected credit losses are most faithfully represented by the proposals in 
the 2009 [Exposure Draft]. Those proposals reflected the economic link between the pricing of 
financial assets and the expected credit losses at initial recognition, and required the immediate 
recognition of the effects of changes in expected credit losses subsequent to initial recognition. 
(IASB, 2013a, p. 10) 
 
This economic rationale also partly explicates the IASB’s own position that the 12-month 
expected credit loss horizon is an “operational simplification” with “no conceptual 
justification” (IASB, 2013a, p. 104), a stance that is reiterated by a number of financial analysts 
who claim that this criterion has no economic foundation (CL CFA Institute, 2013). While this 
results in an initial valuation that is below fair value, the loss serves “as a counterbalancing 
effect to recognising the full interest [revenue]” (IASB Staff Paper, 2013, p. 3). In this way, it 
“act[s] as a proxy for the recognition of initial expected credit losses over time as proposed in 
the 2009 Impairment Exposure Draft” (IASB, 2014c, p. 119). By approximating the outcome 
of its ideal-type model, the IASB preserves a semblance of its long-standing objective to reflect 
the efficiency of loan pricing whilst seeking to incorporate other matters of concern.  
 
In both the [Supplementary Document] and the current proposals, the IASB has sought to 
approximate the outcome of the 2009 [Exposure Draft], in order to reflect the economic 
relationship between the pricing of financial instruments and credit loss expectations, while 
seeking to overcome the operational challenges of those proposals. (IASB, 2013a, p. 8) 
 
Nevertheless, the alternative view to the 2013 Exposure Draft provided by one IASB board 
member, Stephen Cooper, draws on the notion of a purified, efficient market to criticize the 
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approximation strategy. Along these lines, it is argued that there is no conceptual basis for 
recognizing immediate credit losses “when a financial asset is priced on market terms and 
where, consequently, no economic credit loss exists” (IASB, 2013a, p. 142). The alternate view 
specifically questions the ability of the 2013 model to approximate the outcome of the 2009 
approach: “Mr Cooper does not agree that this is true” as this would only happen “by chance” 
(IASB, 2013a, p. 143). This stance is reiterated by an interviewee who proclaims that “[the 
approximation mechanism] isn’t actually a very good mimic for the effect you’d get from doing 
a proper effective interest rate calculation, but it was a compromise that people were willing to 
accept” (Interviewee 21). However, most respondents concur that despite the theoretical 
advantages of the 2009 version of the model, the approach put forth in the 2013 Exposure Draft 
is tolerable because “they do not think that there is a better alternative available that will 
achieve the same balance of benefits versus cost” (IASB Staff Paper, 2013, p. 6).  
 
Many respondents, including users of financial statements acknowledge that the model 
proposed in the IASB’s 2009 Exposure Draft Financial Instruments: Amortised Cost and 
Impairment was conceptually more pure and therefore superior to the proposed model, but they 
also acknowledge that the operational complexities of that model would have resulted in the 
costs of implementation outweighing the benefits of the information provided. (IASB Staff 
Paper, 2013, p. 6) 
 
This sense of tolerability is also illustrated in Table 6 (appendix) which shows that only 30% 
of respondents explicitly oppose the 2013 proposal. This stands in stark contrast with the 
previous three consultations which garnered levels of opposition of 90%, 93%, and 80%, 
respectively (see Tables 3, 4, and 5, appendix). This coincided with realizations on the part of 
some actors that loan pricing mechanisms may not efficiently incorporate expected losses. 
 
5.4.2   Accounting for pricing imperfections 
 
Whilst the 12-month window in Stage 1 appears to represent a boundary in terms of its 
departure from the ideal-type approach, interview data suggests that perceived imperfections 
40 
 
in loan pricing further justify this configuration. In this regard, a number of interviewees state 
that the loss horizon in Stage 1 is acceptable despite the absence of theoretical foundation as 
“it could cover for any imperfections” (Interviewee 15) since, in contrast to what the EMH 
assumes, “the market is not perfect” (Interviewee 22a) due to the economics of portfolios and 
competitive market forces. This sentiment is articulated in the following statement by a key 
IASB staff member involved in devising the final proposal.  
 
We understood that there is room for Day 1 provisioning limited to 12 months because of the 
economics of portfolios. In other words, the bank knows your credit risk and my credit risk but 
because we are in the same portfolio, in terms of facilitating the process they will charge exactly 
the same interest rate in a loan provided to both of us. However, in a huge portfolio they do 
know someone will fail. So the interest rate risk, theoretically, in economic terms there is a 
limitation that it won’t really capture all the expected losses at that time. This is only one aspect. 
There are aspects like competition in some markets. So if I know that I should charge you a 
10% interest rate but all my competitors are charging 7.5% for this type of loan, this type of 
portfolio. Well, I should decrease it to 7.5% otherwise I wouldn’t have any business in this line. 
So this could happen as well. So the pricing is not that perfect. There are imperfections in the 
pricing process in terms of economics and there is literature in economics that explores the 
price imperfection aspect in this business. So I’m comfortable to defend the 12-month 
provisioning, but I’m less comfortable to defend the same for the whole life of the instrument 
because after 12 months you have more evidence of the behavior of that portfolio. (Interviewee 
11) 
 
As a result, embracing the imperfections in the idealized model of loan pricing generates 
leeway in which initial expected losses may be recognized, but only up to a point. As opposed 
to the prohibition of such losses based on a strict adherence to loan pricing efficiency, in this 
situation the EMH acts to limit the horizon for the recognition of credit losses on ‘good’ loans 
to 12-months. It was apparent that exceeding the 12-month horizon in Stage 1 “would be too 
conservative” (IASB Staff Paper, 2013, p. 32) and would not have been tolerated by actors 
concerned with depicting the incorporation of initial expected losses in loan pricing. With its 
12-month horizon, the IASB has constructed an impure, yet tolerable compromise in which its 
EMH-inspired approach is approximated to facilitate operational and regulatory concerns. This 
resulted in a model that was considered to be a workable solution by several different actor 
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groups such as preparers, regulators, auditors from the Big 4, users, and non U.S.-based 
respondents more generally (see Table 6, appendix). 
 
Not only has the theory been observed to influence the expected credit loss model produced by 
the IASB, overlooking the EMH in this instance has facilitated the recognition of relatively 
large immediate credit losses in the approach subsequently developed by the FASB. Through 
its lack of emphasis on reflecting the presumed relationship between loan pricing and initial 
expected credit losses, the FASB model “would require that at each reporting date an entity 
recognize an allowance for all expected credit losses” (FASB, 2012c, p. 6). Accordingly, the 
FASB regards the 12-month horizon of the IASB to be “potentially misleading to investors” 
(FASB, 2012c, p. 139) and U.S.-based respondents expressed the lowest degree of support for 
the IASB’s 2013 model relative to other geographic areas and actor classifications (see Table 
6, appendix). This underscores the significance of how collectives operationalize financial 
economic theories which not only involves a selective application, but also a distinctive 
application as the theory co-performs along with other forces. The following assertion from a 
Big 4 audit partner specializing in financial instruments under IFRS points to the significance 
of how actors apply financial economic theory in this standard-setting project. 
 
The more that you can throw some mud at an efficient market theory that says the Day 1 price 
is somehow sacrosanct, the more you can then start saying that well let’s put lots of losses up 




This paper builds on existing studies by showing how financial economics co-performs the 
construction of a novel approach to impairment for loan assets through a process of translation.  
While the performative character of theories has been observed in the literature, the 
impermanence and varying strengths of performativity are also salient. MacKenzie and Millo’s 
(2003) work on the influence of the Black-Scholes model on option prices shows how theories 
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help shape reality as opposed to merely describing it. Although this tendency has been regarded 
as a strong, ‘Barnesian’, form of performativity (MacKenzie, 2007), the neglect of the model 
during the stock market crash of 1987 highlights the instability of the theory. Arguably, the 
performativity of the EMH is of a different nature which may be partially attributed to the 
difficulty of testing the theory (Ball, 2009; Whitley, 1986). Rather than necessarily making 
markets more efficient, it acts as a cognitive tool that actors often draw on when making 
decisions. As Ball (2009) points out, in spite of its limitations, “the notion that prices efficiently 
incorporate information is an indispensable foundation for how we organize the world” (p. 15). 
This suggests that the cognition distributed by the EMH entails performative effects. 
 
One example of this is the seemingly ubiquitous accounting practice of discounting future cash 
flows to their present value. Discounting relies on a fundamental law of economics referred to 
as ‘the law of one price’ (Lamont & Thaler, 2003) which assumes that “In an efficient market 
all identical goods sell for an identical price” (Ball, 2009, p. 16). According to Ball (2009), 
“[discounting] has not been abandoned presumably because it is a useful—though clearly not 
a perfect—guide for our thinking and calculations when valuing assets, liabilities, and entire 
companies” (p. 16). Whilst paradoxical, it is perhaps unsurprising that the G20’s request for a 
more ‘forward-looking’ impairment model has led to an expansion in discounting despite the 
criticism directed towards the notion of efficient markets during the global financial crisis. As 
opposed to disengaging from the market as was the case on the matter of fair value accounting 
in 2008 (Carruthers, 2017), this change in accounting moves financial institutions closer to it. 
 
While at a general level, expected credit loss models make use of a wider array of available 
information to predict the future, at a lower level of abstraction we have analyzed the 
contrasting objectives of the IASB and the FASB in their respective projects. The EMH made 
a significant difference in the standard-setting process by influencing the construction of the 
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IASB model and the legitimacy of the approach proposed by the FASB. Integrating the theory 
within the calculation of credit losses echoes what MacKenzie (2007) refers to as ‘effective 
performativity’ which occurs when “economic processes incorporating the aspect of economics 
… differ from their analogues in which economics is not incorporated” (p. 60).  
 
We contribute to the literature in three main respects. Firstly, we highlight the co-performation 
of financial economics in the standard-setting process resulting in an “impure” solution which 
aims to account for market imperfections. Secondly, we shed light on a specific translation 
strategy – referred to by the IASB as “approximation” – which transformed an “ideal-type” 
approach into a tolerable outcome. Lastly, we elaborate on the struggles involved in setting 
accounting standards for a worldwide constituency which includes disparities in the application 
of financial economics. 
 
6.1 Financial economics is indispensable but not sufficient 
 
The case under study adds to the accounting standard-setting literature by exemplifying how 
economic theories co-perform accounting standards. It has been observed that the IASB’s 
objective of reflecting the relationship between loan asset values and expected credit losses 
upon origination presumes that pricing mechanisms efficiently incorporate information in 
regards to the risk of default. This resonates with the realist standpoint towards the pricing of 
financial assets (Zuckerman, 2012) known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1965). 
Whilst this coincides with the rising influence of financial economics in accounting standard-
setting which has embraced a presumption of idealized markets in the valuation of assets 
(Power, 2010), we show that performativity in this case was far from a straightforward process. 
This echoes the standpoint of Callon (2007) on the performativity of economic theories: “it is 
not the formula itself that can cause that world, a socio-technical agencement, to exist. Other 




Thus, rather than attempting to isolate the effect of financial economics, this paper emphasizes 
the collective process involved in operationalizing theories in accounting standard-setting. As 
depicted in Translation 1, the IASB’s 2009 proposal was unable to survive despite being largely 
viewed by constituents as an “ideal-type” formulation. The main points of contention at this 
point pertained to the expected difficulties to be faced by preparers in calculating the effective 
interest rate of each and every loan as well as the adequacy of the model in guarding against 
future crises. In particular, with considerable assistance from the Expert Advisory Panel, the 
European banking community proved the unworkability of the ideal-type model. However, 
rather than abandoning its objective, the IASB and its Expert Advisory Panel carried out 
numerous experiments, evaluations, and decisions on how to make this objective operational. 
In this way, the EMH played a significant role in specifying a direction for the IASB’s 
subsequent efforts by limiting the potential recognition of immediate losses. This may be 
observed in Translation 2, where the FASB model was widely rejected by non-U.S. 
constituents on the basis of its apparent departure from an EMH-based conception of economic 
reality in addition to persistent operational concerns. Despite the failure of the models put forth 
in the first two translations, the objective to reflect the efficiency of loan pricing at origination 
remained a core element of many of the discussions taking place throughout the process. It was 
only in Translation 3 that the IASB’s EMH-inspired objective was translated in a manner 
deemed to be tolerable. 
 
This extends the work of Himick and Brivot (2018) who highlight the efforts of groups 
equipped with financial economic theory in the standard-setting domain along with studies 
depicting the influence of financial economics on accounting standards (Ravenscroft & 
Williams, 2009; Young, 2014). We elucidate how financial economics is associated with other, 
more pragmatic concerns which in our case encompassed an obligation to be reconciled. 
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Whereas previous studies tend to shed light on stronger forms of performativity (e.g., 
MacKenzie, 2007; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003), we highlight the propensity of economic theory 
to be translated in accounting standard-setting projects. In this case, the epistemic commitment 
of accounting standard-setters towards the domain of financial economics (Barker & Schulte, 
2017; Durocher & Gendron, 2014; Power, 2010) was subjected to considerable 
experimentation as it shaped the standard-setting process. Following Callon’s (2007) emphasis 
on performativity as a joint activity, we conclude that “economics as such is necessary but not 
sufficient” (p. 338) in determining accounting standards. This points to the potential instability 
of ‘ideal-type’ solutions that are not translated within standard-setting networks, irrespective 
of their perceived conceptual merit. Financial economics is thus limited by a broad notion of 
tolerability that is not solely attributable to its apparent decision-usefulness. 
 
In doing so, we offer an empirical example of Power’s (2010) insightful assertion that whilst 
the application of financial economics in accounting is impure, it entails significant 
implications. In our case, the EMH constituted a cognitive force that actor groups were framed 
by which played an important role in connecting and disconnecting agents. From the 
perspective of the IASB and a majority of its constituents, the efficiency of loan pricing with 
respect to expected credit losses constituted a robust cognitive force. This persisted despite the 
realization by some actors that the “ideal-type” approach was impossible to execute and that 
loan pricing itself may be imperfect. Thus, the traces of the theory did not vanish when 
constrained by the existence of other realities. Rather than ruling out its influence, this resulted 
in an “impure” application when the theory encountered the reality expected to result from its 
implementation. Despite this, the EMH had an immense importance in the standard-setting 
project by adding purity to the obligatory passage point through which other forces were 
required to traverse. The next sub-section discusses the specific translation strategy that has 




6.2 Forging a tolerable solution through a process of approximation 
 
Whilst the abandonment of the proposed ‘ideal-type’ impairment model suggests that 
concessions were enacted to reach an agreement, this was not observed to result in the mere 
‘capture’ of the standard-setting process. Rather, in finding a tolerable solution, the IASB 
laboriously endeavored to link its idealized approach with other disparate concerns. 
Accordingly, this case details a particular strategy involved in translating a standard-setting 
objective inspired by financial economics. Whilst the ideal-type model in Translation 1 
received widespread support in terms of its theoretical foundation, we show how the IASB 
transformed this approach through a process of approximation. This involved extensive efforts 
to link its objective of reflecting the economic reality of lending with other matters of concern 
which resulted in a unique configuration. This was accomplished by means of approximating 
the expected financial statement outcomes associated with the ideal-type formulation in such a 
way as to result in a workable solution in the eyes of key constituents. Nevertheless, this 
strategy comprised of a significant degree of experimentation which initially failed during joint 
efforts with the FASB before reaching a state of temporary stability in the IASB’s subsequent 
work. 
 
Given its insistence on reflecting a purified conception of loan pricing, the IASB was tasked 
with devising a feasible approach that serves as a proxy for its ideal-type model. In Translation 
2, the calculation of credit losses on loans in the ‘Good Book’ was widely considered as a poor 
approximation of the reality that the ideal-type model would have depicted. This was attributed 
to the FASB’s inclusion of the ‘Foreseeable Future Floor’ which was expected to result in 
relatively large initial losses. Conversely, the IASB’s construction of a 12-month horizon for 
determining credit losses on such loans in Translation 3 was largely seen as a bearable 
approximation the ideal-type model whilst coinciding to a certain degree with prudential 
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regulation. Thus, in addition to the voicing of support, we argue that the notion of silence (an 
indeterminable level of support or opposition to standard-setting proposals) is an important 
barometer of tolerability and provisional closure. 
 
The approximation strategy and its attention to the notion of tolerability highlights an important 
finding of this study. Whereas Huikku et al. (2017) explore the performativity of an accounting 
standard as it is applied and translated in accounting practice, our study examines how financial 
economics performs the standard itself through a process of translation. In regards to the 
application of accounting standards, Huikku et al. (2017) point to the importance of solutions 
that can be tolerated by actors who consequently draw on economic averages from outside the 
firm to enhance the reliability of estimates. We add to this significant finding by showing that, 
in the context of accounting standard-setting, the tolerability of the eventual outcome in the 
eyes of key actors is paramount. Although experiments in accounting standard-setting can, in 
principle, carry on indefinitely, our case highlights the importance of the elements of time and 
compromise within the notion of tolerability. After six years of negotiations including a failed 
convergence project, the IASB was compelled to deliver a workable response to the concerns 
raised during the financial crisis on the matter of impairment. According to IASB Chairman 
Hans Hoogervorst, “it remains to be seen if an expected credit loss model in itself can predict 
the next crisis” considering that preceding the financial crisis “the market was not expecting 
the losses that were about to hit” (Hoogervorst, 2014, p. 5). Tolerability may thus be regarded 
as a conduit of overflowing since it does not necessarily resolve the problems identified by 
instigating actors. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that both the construction and application of 
accounting standards emphasize tolerability at the expense of ideal-types or solutions that suit 




Considering the recoupling of accounting to society which occurred at the advent of the global 
financial crisis (Power, 2010), our understanding of how the financial economics-inspired 
program in accounting standard-setting links up with wider macroeconomic policies (Plantin 
et al., 2008) remains largely underdeveloped. We observe how financial economics serves as 
a malleable anchor in the standard-setting process which sets the premises for negotiations 
whilst limiting the extent to which outcomes can deviate from idealized perceptions of 
economic reality. This demonstrates that although standard-setters may draw on economic 
theory in their endeavors of ‘getting the accounting right’ (Young, 1995), the application of 
financial economics transforms due to associations with the external environment. 
 
6.3 Financial economics and the struggles of setting global financial reporting standards 
 
Following Himick and Brivot’s (2018) call for research on the “who and why” elements behind 
transformations in accounting standards, we show that accounting change may be stimulated 
by a financial crisis and influential actors such as the G20 and the Financial Crisis Advisory 
Group can effectively problematize the need for change. Along these lines, the requests for a 
more forward-looking financial asset impairment model were consistent with the hypothetical 
needs of the “forward-looking individuals” enshrined as the users of financial reporting 
information in the conceptual framework (Young, 2006, p. 595). However, whilst economic 
crises are often followed by appeals to enhance transparency (Arnold, 2012), the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis also included calls for standard-setters help mitigate procyclicality. 
This generates a degree of tension because, drawing on an EMH view of loan pricing, any 
forward-looking impairment model faces constraints in terms of immediate loss recognition. 
Paradoxically, this shows how financial economics can limit the expansion of ‘forward-
looking’ approaches in financial accounting, albeit only for the IASB as opposed to the FASB 




Despite the existence of a joint conceptual framework constructed from the perspective of “the 
rational economic actor” (Young, 2006, p. 592), convergence between the two boards was 
unsuccessful. As stated by Pelger (2016), the manner in which this rationale permeates 
accounting standards is uncertain. We observe that, irrespective of the primary objective of 
financial reporting, individual standard-setting projects may be imbued with far more specific 
aims. These objectives infused the process with contrasting purposes which formed the basis 
for the ensuing transformations which transpired in conjunction with variations in lending 
practice (i.e., loan durations) and prudential concerns (i.e., bank capital requirements). The 
consideration of these disparities appears to have resulted in relatively stable models on both 
ends. Hence, it is difficult to discern whether a single, global accounting standard-setting board 
would have been able to devise a tolerable worldwide approach. 
 
Concurrently, this paper illuminates the capacity of actors to effectively challenge elements of 
financial economic theory (in the case of the FASB) along with the necessity of enacting 
adjustments to address market imperfections (in the case of the IASB). While the conviction 
that loan pricing mechanisms are largely efficient limits the acceptability of recognizing losses 
at inception for the IASB, an absence of adherence to this hypothesis significantly widens 
possibilities for the FASB in terms of immediate loss recognition. Interestingly, the FASB did 
not adopt a similar economic rationality despite its reputedly strong affiliation with the realm 
of financial economics (Pelger, 2016; Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009; Young & Williams, 
2010). By disregarding and, at times, questioning the ability of firms to isolate the amount of 
initial expected losses, in this instance the FASB and many of its constituents stressed the 
adequacy loan loss provisions on the balance sheet (i.e., mitigating procyclicality) as opposed 
to the reflection of a ‘perfect’ initial valuation. This provides another example of the 
incoherence associated with the financialization of accounting (Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009) 
50 
 
by showing how the translation of the abstract theories of financial economics into accounting 
standards may lead to vastly different outcomes. 
 
Whilst seemingly surprising, our focus on the sociology of translation offers a useful vantage 
point to understand why the combined IASB–FASB network failed to be stabilized (Robson & 
Bottausci, 2017) as opposed to other convergence projects that were successful (e.g., Baudot, 
2018). In this way, we provide a specific example of the struggles involved in finding common 
ground in IASB–FASB convergence projects following the global financial crisis (Baudot, 
2014). By adopting the perspective that “knowledge and action are never individual” (Callon 
& Muniesa, 2005, p. 1237), it may be inferred that cognition is distributed within networks. In 
the case of the IASB, its EMH-inspired objective persevered despite significant changes in the 
composition of the board which consisted of a decline in board members with “strong technical 
backgrounds” (Camfferman & Zeff, 2015, p. 608). Moreover, by illuminating the 
unworkability of this application of the EMH in the case of the FASB, we begin to explicate 




The perspective on accounting standard-setting highlighted in this paper aims to bridge the gap 
between the power of constituents to capture the standard-setting process, the influence of 
standard-setters and the role of theory within this procedure. According to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), accounting standards are the result of the lobbying efforts of self-
interested groups with economic incentives to influence the standard-setting process. In this 
way, theories are deployed by interest groups as justification for particular solutions (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1979) which may result in the ‘ideological capture’ of the process (Ramanna, 
2015). Moreover, the ostensibly “aggressive top-down” nature of standard-setting has been 
criticized for its disregard of social norms (Sunder, 2016, p. 221). Nevertheless, the 
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financialization of standard-setting is limited (Müller, 2014) and the shift to fair value has not 
been comprehensive (Power, 2010). We build on these studies by providing a vivid example 
of how reality is communicated (Hines, 1988a) as financial economics co-performs in 
conjunction with other matters of concern. By explicating these linkages, we develop a better 
comprehension of how two extremes – the seemingly pure theories of financial economics and 
the inescapable politics of accounting standard-setting – may be interwoven. Future studies 
may explore how financial economics is associated with disparate concerns in other standard-
setting projects. Such research may continue to progress our understanding of the selectivity 
and impurities involved in utilizing financial economics in financial accounting (Power, 2010). 
 
This case represents part of the so-called ‘sea change’ in financial reporting towards the 
precepts of financial economics predicated upon future expected events. However, we highlight 
the nuances of this forward-looking enterprise in regards to its perceived feasibility along with 
divergent views on what is expected to occur in the future in comparison with what is believed 
to have already taken place. For instance, with respect to the inclusion of expected losses, loan 
pricing may be viewed from a standpoint of purity or it may be considered as an imperfect 
exercise. These dynamics largely resonate with the ambiguous standing of the EMH within 
economics (Fama, 1965; Shiller, 1981). Nevertheless, we illustrate how the EMH distributed 
cognition within the IASB network, framing actors by restricting what they can legitimately 
do. The IASB’s 12-month loss horizon served as a boundary in terms of how far the solution 
could depart from the ideal-type approach whilst still being regarded as tolerable. Future 
research may shed light on how notions of market efficiency influence accounting standards in 
situations that consist of more explicit market imperfections, such as in instances of illiquidity.  
 
In this case, the IASB’s expected credit loss model was constructed after a series of in vitro 
laboratory experiments concerning an uncertain future which resulted in a compromise 
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solution. While the study points to the struggles involved in the assembly of increasingly 
complex ‘forward-looking’ models in financial reporting standards, the effects of the eventual 
outcome are unknown. According to Beckert (2016), “the sophistication of the econometric 
models used in forecasts does not improve their accuracy” (p. 226). However, a more important 
point may pertain to the ability of such models to generate “credible imaginaries” (Beckert, 
2016, p. 245). Drawing on economic theories, these imagined futures may be expected to instill 
confidence among actors, yet the overflows they produce may also be substantial. Therefore, 
subsequent studies may analyze the in vivo real life effects of accounting standards inspired by 
financial economics, such as the expected credit loss methodologies adopted in various 
jurisdictions. How will these approaches to loan loss provisioning contribute to the efficiency 
of loan pricing? Moreover, will the predictive capabilities of these accounting models 
(Kinsella, 2019) mitigate procyclicality in subsequent financial crises as desired by the G20? 
 
Furthermore, this paper highlights some of the practical difficulties involved in the realization 
of global financial reporting standards. It has been demonstrated that placing a primary reliance 
on the conceptual framework provided an insufficient basis for convergence. Hence, the paper 
points to the importance of translating the valuation-usefulness program of financial reporting 
into specific accounting standard-setting networks. This begins to answer Pelger’s (2016) call 
to examine how the decision-usefulness program is applied in the setting of accounting 
standards. We find that the conflicting objectives aspired towards by each board produced 
conceptual tensions that were exacerbated by contrasting operational and prudential concerns 
across two networks. While this may resonate with Sunder’s (2016) call for an enhanced 
attention to bottom-up approaches to financial accounting, it certainly points to a case in which 




The above analysis suggests that in contentious situations accounting standard-setters aim to 
produce tolerable standards that will “be able to survive and live in this world” (Callon et al., 
2009, p. 48) albeit on a temporary basis. Rather than underscoring the deterministic success of 
financial economics, we draw attention to the transformations involved in making economic 
theories workable through a strategy of approximation. This indicates that the usage of 
economic theories in accounting standard-setting is not an ‘all or nothing’ proposition. We find 
that financial economics plays a more nuanced role in the standard-setting process, involving 
an arduous translation of wills resulting in impure solutions. While our study on the 
performativity of economic theories highly resonates with the relational and material approach 
of D’Adderio, Glaser, and Pollock (2019), we emphasize the role played by accountants in 
























Table 2: IASB/FASB Documents Utilized in the Analysis 
 
 




2009 Agenda Paper 14 (April 2009) IASB Staff Paper (2009b)
Request for Information (June 2009) IASB (2009a)
IASB Update (September 2009) IASB (2009b)
Comment Letter Summary (September 2009) IASB Staff Paper (2009a)
Agenda Paper 12B (September 2009) IASB Staff Paper (2009c)
Exposure Draft (November 2009) IASB (2009c)
Exposure Draft – Basis for Conclusions (November 2009) IASB (2009d)
Comment Letters (Request for Information) IASB website
2010 Implementation Guidance – IAS 39 (January 2010) IASB (2010c)
Agenda Paper 9A (July 2010) IASB Staff Paper (2010c)
IASB Update (September 2010) IASB (2010a)
Agenda Paper 13 (September 2010) IASB Staff Paper (2010a)
Agenda Paper 15 (September 2010) IASB Staff Paper (2010b)
Comment Letters (Exposure Draft) IASB website
2011 Supplementary Document (January 2011) IASB (2011)
Comment Letter Summary – Supplementary Document (April 2011) IASB Staff Paper (2011a)
Summary of Outreach – Supplementary Document (April 2011) IASB Staff Paper (2011b)
Comment Letters (Supplementary Document) IASB website
2012 Meeting Minutes (July 2012) FASB (2012d)
Meeting Minutes (August 2012) FASB (2012a)
Meeting Minutes (August 2012) FASB (2012b)
IASB Update (November 2012) IASB (2012a)
Exposure Draft (December 2012) FASB (2012c)
IASB Update (December 2012) IASB (2012b)
2013 Exposure Draft (March 2013) IASB (2013a)
Exposure Draft – Snapshot (March 2013) IASB (2013b)
Comment Letter Summary – Exposure Draft (July 2013) IASB Staff Paper (2013)
Comment Letters (Exposure Draft) IASB website
2014 IASB Update (January 2014) IASB (2014a)
Basis for Conclusions on IFRS 9 (July 2014) IASB (2014c)
Number of 
responses
Support (%) Oppose (%) Undecidable (%)
Accountancy bodies 10 10% 70% 20%
Accounting firms:
  - Big 4 3 0% 100% 0%
  - Non-Big 4 1 0% 100% 0%
Financial institution preparers: 
  - Companies 18 6% 89% 6%
  - Representative bodies 18 0% 100% 0%
Other preparers: 
  - Companies 4 0% 100% 0%
  - Representative bodies 7 0% 100% 0%
Regulators 6 0% 100% 0%
Standard-setters 12 0% 92% 8%
Users 1 100% 0% 0%
Miscellaneous 8 13% 75% 13%
    Totals 88 5% 90% 6%
Geographic region:
  - Europe 52 2% 92% 6%
  - USA 8 0% 100% 0%
  - Other 28 11% 82% 7%


















Support (%) Oppose (%) Undecidable (%)
Accountancy bodies 28 11% 86% 4%
Accounting firms:
  - Big 4 5 0% 100% 0%
  - Non-Big 4 5 0% 100% 0%
Financial institution preparers: 
  - Companies 32 3% 97% 0%
  - Representative bodies 37 0% 100% 0%
Other preparers: 
  - Companies 17 6% 88% 6%
  - Representative bodies 7 0% 100% 0%
Regulators 14 21% 79% 0%
Standard-setters 20 10% 90% 0%
Users 11 18% 82% 0%
Miscellaneous 18 0% 100% 0%
    Totals 194 6% 93% 1%
Geographic region:
  - Europe 108 4% 95% 1%
  - USA 21 0% 100% 0%
  - Other 65 12% 86% 2%
    Totals 194 6% 93% 1%
Number of 
responses
Support (%) Oppose (%) Undecidable (%)
Accountancy bodies 16 25% 75% 0%
Accounting firms:
  - Big 4 4 25% 75% 0%
  - Non-Big 4 9 11% 78% 11%
Financial institution preparers: 
  - Companies 64 6% 83% 11%
  - Representative bodies 35 3% 86% 11%
Other preparers: 
  - Companies 14 14% 86% 0%
  - Representative bodies 12 17% 75% 8%
Regulators 17 18% 59% 24%
Standard-setters 19 0% 79% 21%
Users 6 0% 83% 17%
Miscellaneous 16 6% 81% 13%
    Totals 212 9% 80% 11%
Geographic region:
  - Europe 78 8% 78% 14%
  - USA 79 10% 85% 5%
  - Other 55 9% 75% 16%
    Totals 212 9% 80% 11%
56 
 







BCBS (2009). Guiding Principles for the Replacement of IAS 39, Basel Committee of 
Banking Supervision, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs161.pdf 
EAP (2010). Amortised Cost and Impairment. Summary of all EAP meetings, Expert 
Advisory Panel. 
FASB (2012a). August 1, 2012 FASB Board Meeting—Accounting for Financial 
Instruments: Impairment, Meeting Minutes, Accounting for Financial Instruments 
Team, August 2, 2012.  
FASB (2012b). August 22, 2012 FASB Board Meeting—Accounting for Financial 
Instruments: Impairment, Meeting Minutes, Accounting for Financial Instruments 
Team, August 29, 2012.  
FASB (2012c). Exposure Draft, Financial Instruments—Credit Losses, (Subtopic 825-15), 
Proposed Accounting Standards Update, December 20, 2012.  
FASB (2012d). July 18, 2012 FASB Board Meeting—Accounting for Financial Instruments: 
Impairment, Meeting Minutes, Accounting for Financial Instruments Team, July 20, 
2012.    
Financial Crisis Advisory Group (2009). Report of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group, July 
28, 2009.   
FSF (2009a). Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Procyclicality in the 
Financial System, 2 April 2009.   
FSF (2009b). Report of the FSF Working Group on Provisioning, March 2009. 
G20 (2009). Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System – London Summit, 2 April 
2009.  
G20 Working Group 1 (2009). Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening 
Transparency. Final Report. March 25, 2009. 
Number of 
responses
Support (%) Oppose (%) Undecidable (%)
Accountancy bodies 19 63% 26% 11%
Accounting firms:
  - Big 4 4 75% 0% 25%
  - Non-Big 4 7 57% 43% 0%
Financial institution preparers: 
  - Companies 42 50% 33% 17%
  - Representative bodies 31 45% 48% 6%
Other preparers: 
  - Companies 15 33% 33% 33%
  - Representative bodies 12 50% 8% 42%
Regulators 15 73% 20% 7%
Standard-setters 22 64% 9% 27%
Users 7 57% 29% 14%
Miscellaneous 15 33% 47% 20%
    Totals 189 52% 30% 17%
Geographic region:
  - Europe 98 62% 27% 11%
  - USA 31 19% 48% 32%
  - Other 60 53% 27% 20%
    Totals 189 52% 30% 17%
57 
 
IASB (2008a). A Guide Through International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, July 2008. 
IASB (2008b). IASB Update. Board Decisions on International Financial Reporting 
Standards. November 2008. IASC Foundation.   
IASB (2009a). Request for Information (‘Expected Loss Model’) Impairment of Financial 
Assets: Expected Cash Flow Approach, IASC Foundation.  
IASB (2009b). IASB Update. Board Decisions on International Financial Reporting 
Standards. September 2009. IASC Foundation.  
IASB (2009c). Financial Instruments: Amortised Cost and Impairment. Exposure Draft 
ED/2009/12, November 2009, IASC Foundation.  
IASB (2009d). Financial Instruments: Amortised Cost and Impairment. Basis for Conclusions 
– Exposure Draft ED/2009/12, November 2009, IASC Foundation. 
IASB (2010a). IASB Update. From the International Accounting Standards Board. 
September 2010, IFRS Foundation. 
IASB (2010b). Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 2010, International 
Accounting Standards Board, September 2010.  
IASB (2010c). Implementation Guidance. International Accounting Standard IAS 39. 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. International Accounting 
Standards Committee Foundation. January 2010. 
IASB (2011). Supplement to ED/2009/12. Financial Instruments: Amortised Cost and 
Impairment, IFRS Foundation. 
IASB (2012a). IASB Update. From the International Accounting Standards Board. November 
2012, IFRS Foundation. 
IASB (2012b). IASB Update. From the International Accounting Standards Board. December 
2012, IFRS Foundation. 
IASB (2013a). Financial Instruments: Expected Credit Losses. Exposure Draft ED/2013/3. 
March 2013, IFRS Foundation. 
IASB (2013b). Exposure Draft. Snapshot: Financial Instruments: Expected Credit Losses. 
March 2013, IFRS Foundation. 
IASB (2014a). IASB Update. From the International Accounting Standards Board. January 
2014, IFRS Foundation. 
IASB (2014b). IASB completes reform of financial instruments accounting, Press Release, 24 
July 2014, IFRS Foundation.  
IASB (2014c). Basis for Conclusions on IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, IFRS Foundation, 
July 2014.  
IASB Staff Paper (2009a). Impairment: summary feedback analysis for the Request for 
Information regarding the expected cash flow approach, September 2009.  
IASB Staff Paper (2009b). Measurement Methods: Amortised Cost, Agenda reference: 14, 
April 2009. 
IASB Staff Paper (2009c). Impairment: Staff recommendations and questions to the Board, 
Agenda reference: 12B, September 2009. 
IASB Staff Paper (2010a). Cover Paper – Education Session, Agenda reference: 13, 
IASB/FASB Meeting September 2010.  
IASB Staff Paper (2010b). Treatment of initial expected loss, Agenda reference: 15, IASB 
Meeting, Week beginning 13 September 2010.  
IASB Staff Paper (2010c). Comment Letter Summary. Financial Instruments: Impairment. 
Agenda reference: 9A, July 2010. 
IASB Staff Paper (2011a). Financial Instruments: Impairment. Comment letter summary, 
April 2011, Agenda reference: 4D. 
58 
 
IASB Staff Paper (2011b). Summary of Outreach for Supplementary Document on 
Impairment, April 2011, Agenda reference: 4E. 
IASB Staff Paper (2013). Comment Letter Summary, Agenda reference: 5C, 22-26 July 
2013. 
IFRS Foundation (2015). Transition Resource Group for Impairment of Financial 
Instruments. Meeting Summary. 22 April 2015. 
IFRS Foundation (2016). IAS Standard 39. Financial Instruments: Recognition and 




Andon, P., Baxter, J., & Chua, W. F. (2007). Accounting change as relational drifting: A field 
study of experiments with performance measurement. Management Accounting 
Research, 18(2), 273-308. 
André, P., Cazavan-Jeny, A., Dick, W., Richard, C., & Walton, P. (2009). Fair value 
accounting and the banking crisis in 2008: Shooting the messenger. Accounting in 
Europe, 6(1), 3-24.  
Arnold, P. J. (2009). Global financial crisis: The challenge to accounting research. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6-7), 803-809.  
Arnold, P. J. (2012). The political economy of financial harmonization: The East Asian 
financial crisis and the rise of international accounting standards. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 37(6), 361-381. 
Baudot, L. (2014). GAAP convergence or convergence Gap: Unfolding ten years of 
accounting change. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 27(6), 956-994. 
Baudot, L. (2018). On commitment toward knowledge templates in global standard setting: 
The case of the FASB‐IASB revenue project. Contemporary Accounting Research. 
doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12396 
Ball, R. (2009). The global financial crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: What have 
we learned? Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 21(4), 8-16. 
Barker, R., & Schulte, S. (2017). Representing the market perspective: Fair value 
measurement for non-financial assets. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 56, 55-
67. 
Basu, S. (1977). Investment performance of common stocks in relation to their price-earnings 
ratios: A test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The Journal of Finance, 32(3), 663-
682. 
Bayou, M. E., Reinstein, A., & Williams, P. F. (2011). To tell the truth: A discussion of 
issues concerning truth and ethics in accounting. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 36(2), 109-124. 
Beaver, W., Eger, C., Ryan, S., & Wolfson, M. (1989). Financial reporting, supplemental 
disclosures, and bank share prices. Journal of Accounting Research, 27(2), 157-178. 
Beckert, J. (2016). Imagined futures. Harvard University Press. 
Bengtsson, E. (2011). Repoliticalization of accounting standard setting—The IASB, the EU 
and the global financial crisis. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 22(6), 567-580. 
Bougen, P. D., & Young, J. J. (2012). Fair value accounting: Simulacra and simulation. 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23(4-5), 390-402.    
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A. G., Hughes, J., & Nahapiet, J. (1980). The roles of 
accounting in organizations and society. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5(1), 
5-27. 
Cairns, D. (2006). The use of fair value in IFRS. Accounting in Europe, 3(1), 5-22. 
59 
 
Cairns, D. (2012). The use of fair value in IFRS. In Walton, P. (Ed.), The Routledge 
Companion to Fair Value and Financial Reporting (pp. 25-39). Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge. 
Çalışkan, K., & Callon, M. (2010). Economization, part 2: A research programme for the 
study of markets. Economy and Society, 39(1), 1-32. 
Callon, M. (1986). Some elements of Sociology of translation: Domestication of the scallops 
and the fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay. Sociological Review Monograph, 32, 196-233. 
Callon, M. (1998a). An essay on framing and overflowing: Economic externalities revisited 
by Sociology. In Callon, M. (Ed.), The Laws of the Market (pp. 244-269). Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell Publishers. 
Callon, M. (1998b). Introduction: The embeddedness of economic markets in economics. In 
Callon, M. (Ed.), The Laws of the Market (pp. 1-57). Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Callon, M. (2007). What does it mean to say that economics is performative? In MacKenzie, 
D., Muniesa, F., and Siu, L. (Eds.), Do Economists Make Markets? On the 
Performativity of Economics. New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press. 
Callon, M. (2009). Civilizing markets: Carbon trading between in vitro and in vivo 
experiments. Accounting, organizations and society, 34(3-4), 535-548. 
Callon, M., Lascoumes, P., & Barthe, Y. (2009). Acting in an Uncertain World: An Essay on 
Technical Democracy. Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press. 
Callon, M., & Latour, B. (1981). Unscrewing the big Leviathans: How do actors 
macrostructure reality. In Knorr, K., and Cicourel, A. (Eds.), Advances in Social 
Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro and Macro Sociologies 
(pp. 277-303). London, UK: Routledge. 
Callon, M., & Muniesa, F. (2005). Peripheral vision: Economic markets as calculative 
collective devices. Organization studies, 26(8), 1229-1250. 
Camfferman, K., & Zeff, S. A. (2015). Aiming for Global Accounting Standards: The 
International Accounting Standards Board, 2001-2011, Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Carruthers, B. G. (2017). Financial decommodification: Risk and the politics of valuation in 
US banks. In Balleisen, E. J., Bennear, L. S., Krawiec, K. D., and Wiener, J. B. (Eds.), 
Policy Shock: Recalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil Spills, Nuclear Accidents 
and Financial Crises (pp. 371-394). Massachusetts, USA: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Chapman, C., Cooper, D., & Miller, P. (2009). Linking accounting, institutions and 
organizations. In Chapman, C., Cooper, D., and Miller, P. (Eds.) Accounting, 
Organizations, and Institutions: Essays in Honour of Anthony Hopwood (pp. 1-29). 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Chiapello, E. (2008). Accounting at the heart of the performativity of economics. European 
Sociology Newsletter, 10(1), 12-15. 
Christensen, M., Skærbæk, P., & Tryggestad, K. (2019). Contested organizational change and 
accounting in trials of incompatibility. Management Accounting Research, in press, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2019.03.001 
Cooper, C. (2015). Accounting for the fictitious: A Marxist contribution to understanding 
accounting's roles in the financial crisis. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 30, 63-
82. 
Cooper, D. J., & Robson, K. (2006). Accounting, professions and regulation: Locating the 
sites of professionalization. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(4-5), 415-444. 
60 
 
Cushen, J. (2013). Financialization in the workplace: Hegemonic narratives, performative 
interventions and the angry knowledge worker. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 38(4), 314-331. 
Deloitte (2014). IFRS 9: Financial Instruments. Overview of the new requirements. Retrieved 
from https://www2.deloitte.com  
Dempsey, M. (2013). The capital asset pricing model (CAPM): The history of a failed 
revolutionary idea in finance? Abacus, 49(S1), 7-23.  
Desai, M. (2015). Hubris: Why Economists Failed to Predict the Crisis and How to Avoid the 
Next One. Connecticut, USA: Yale University Press. 
D’Adderio, L., Glaser, V., & Pollock, N. (2019). Performing theories, transforming 
organizations: A reply to Marti and Gond. Academy of Management Review, in press. 
Durocher, S., & Gendron, Y. (2014). Epistemic commitment and cognitive disunity toward 
fair-value accounting. Accounting and Business Research, 44(6), 630-655.  
Erb, C., & Pelger, C. (2015). “Twisting words”? A study of the construction and 
reconstruction of reliability in financial reporting standard-setting. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 40, 13-40.   




European Union (2015). The significance of IFRS 9 for financial stability and supervisory 
Rules. Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/563461/IPOL_STU%282
015%29563461_EN.pdf 
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. The Journal of Business, 38(1), 34-
105. 
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417. 
Fama, E. F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance1. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 49(3), 283-306. 
Fama, E. F. (2014). Two pillars of asset pricing. American Economic Review, 104(6), 1467–
1485. 
Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. I. (2009). How and why theories matter: A comment on 
Felin and Foss (2009). Organization Science, 20(3), 669-675. 
Fox, J. (2011). The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on 
Wall Street. Petersfield, England: Harriman House Limited. 
Gendron, Y., & Smith-Lacroix, J. H. (2015). The global financial crisis: Essay on the 
possibility of substantive change in the discipline of finance. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 30, 83-101. 
Georgiou, O., & Jack, L. (2011). In pursuit of legitimacy: A history behind fair value 
accounting. The British Accounting Review, 43(4), 311-323.   
 
Himick, D., & Brivot, M. (2018). Carriers of ideas in accounting standard-setting and 
financialization: The role of epistemic communities. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 66, 29-44. 
Hines, R. D. (1988a). Financial accounting: In communicating reality, we construct reality. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 13(3), 251-261. 
Hines, R. D. (1988b). Popper's methodology of falsificationism and accounting research. The 
Accounting Review, 63(4), 657-662. 
61 
 
Hines, R. D. (1991). The FASB's conceptual framework, financial accounting and the 
maintenance of the social world. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16(4), 313-
331. 
Hoogervorst, H. (2014). Closing the accounting chapter of the financial crisis. Retrieved 
from https://www.ifrs.org/-/media/feature/news/speeches/2014/hans-hoogervorst-
march-2014.pdf  
Hoogervorst, H. (2015). Preparing for the expected: implementing IFRS 9. Retrieved from 
https://www.ifrs.org/-/media/feature/news/speeches/2015/hans-hoogervorst-icaew-
sept-2015.pdf  
Hopwood, A. G. (1983). On trying to study accounting in the contexts in which it operates. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 8(2-3), 287-305. 
Hopwood, A. G. (1992). The relationship between accounting and economics. Accounting 
calculation and the shifting sphere of the economic. European Accounting Review, 
1(1), 125-143. 
Hopwood, A. G. (2007). Whither accounting research? The Accounting Review, 82(5), 1365-
1374. 
Hopwood, A. G. (2009a). Reflections and projections – and many, many thanks. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 34(8), 887-894. 
Hopwood, A. G. (2009b). The economic crisis and accounting: Implications for the research 
community. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6-7), 797-802. 
Huikku, J., Mouritsen, J., & Silvola, H. (2017). Relative reliability and the recognisable firm: 
Calculating goodwill impairment value. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 56, 
68-83.  
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press. 
Kinsella, S. (2019). Visualising economic crises using accounting models. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society. doi:10.1016/j.aos.2019.01.001 
KPMG (2015). ITG discussions under way. Retrieved from 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/04/impairment-newsletter-2015-
01.pdf 
Lagneau-Ymonet, P., & Quack, S. (2012). What's the problem? Competing diagnoses and 
shifting coalitions in the reform of international accounting standards. In Mayntz, R. 
(Ed.), Crisis and Control: Institutional Change in Financial Market Regulation (pp. 
211-244). Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag. 
Lamont, O. A., & Thaler, R. H. (2003). Anomalies: The law of one price in financial 
markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 191-202. 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Laux, C. (2012). Financial instruments, financial reporting, and financial stability. 
Accounting and Business Research, 42(3), 239-260. 
Laux, C., & Leuz, C. (2009). The crisis of fair-value accounting: Making sense of the recent 
debate. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6-7), 826-834.  
Laux, C., & Leuz, C. (2010). Did fair-value accounting contribute to the financial 
crisis? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1), 93-118. 
MacKenzie, D. (2006). An Engine, Not a Camera. How Financial Models Shape Markets. 
Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press. 
MacKenzie, D. (2007). Is economics performative? Option theory and the construction of 
derivatives markets. In Mackenzie D., Muniesa, F., and Siu L. (Eds.) Do Economists 




MacKenzie, D. (2009). Making things the same: Gases, emission rights and the politics of 
carbon markets. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(3-4), 440-455. 
MacKenzie, D., & Millo, Y. (2003). Constructing a market, performing theory: The historical 
sociology of a financial derivatives exchange. American Journal of Sociology, 109(1), 
107-145.  
MacKenzie, D., Muniesa, F., & Siu, L. (2007). Do Economists Make Markets? On the 
Performativity of Economics. New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press. 
Mahama, H., & Chua, W. F. (2016). A study of alliance dynamics, accounting and trust-as-
practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 51, 29-46. 
 
McKee, A. J., Williams, P. F., & Frazier, K. B. (1991). A case study of accounting firm 
lobbying: Advice or consent. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2(3), 273-294. 
McNicholas, P., & Windsor, C. (2011). Can the financialised atmosphere be effectively 
regulated and accounted for? Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 24(8), 
1071-1096. 
Miller, P. (1991). Accounting innovation beyond the enterprise: Problematizing investment 
decisions and programming economic growth in the U.K. in the 1960s. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 16(8), 733-762.  
Miller, P. (1998). The margins of accounting. European Accounting Review, 7(4), 605-621. 
Miller, P., & Power, M. (2013). Accounting, organizing, and economizing: Connecting 
accounting research and organization theory. The Academy of Management Annals, 
7(1), 557-605. 
Millo, Y., & MacKenzie, D. (2009). The usefulness of inaccurate models: Towards an 
understanding of the emergence of financial risk management. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 34(5), 638-653. 
Moosa, I. A. (2013). The capital asset pricing model (CAPM): The history of a failed 
revolutionary idea in finance? Comments and extensions. Abacus, 49(S1), 62-68. 
Mouck, T. (1998). Capital markets research and real world complexity: The emerging 
challenge of chaos theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 23(2), 189-215. 
Müller, J. (2014). An accounting revolution? The financialisation of standard setting. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 25(7), 539-557.   
Nobel Foundation (2013). The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred Nobel 2013 [Press release]. Retrieved from 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2013/press-release/ 
Nobes, C. (2015). IFRS ten years on: Has the IASB imposed extensive use of fair value? Has 
the EU learnt to love IFRS? And does the use of fair value make IFRS illegal in the 
EU? Accounting in Europe, 12(2), 153-170. 
Patton, M. Q. (2015). Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (4th ed). California, USA: 
SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Pelger, C. (2016). Practices of standard-setting – An analysis of the IASB's and FASB's 
process of identifying the objective of financial reporting. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 50, 51-73. 
Plantin, G., Sapra, H., & Shin, H. S. (2008). Fair value accounting and financial stability. 
Banque de France, Financial Stability Review, 12, 85- 94. Retrieved from 
https://www.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/financial-stability-
review-12_2008-10.pdf 
Pollock, N., & D’Adderio, L. (2012). Give me a two-by-two matrix and I will create the 
market: Rankings, graphic visualisations and sociomateriality. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 37(8), 565-586. 
63 
 
Power, M. (2010). Fair value accounting, financial economics and the transformation of 
reliability. Accounting and Business Research, 40(3), 197-210. 
PWC (2014). In depth. IFRS 9: Expected credit losses. Retrieved from 
https://www.pwchk.com/en/indepth/indepth-ifrs9-credit-loss-aug2014.pdf 
Ramanna, K. (2015). Political Standards: Corporate Interest, Ideology, and Leadership in 
the Shaping of Accounting Rules for the Market Economy. Illinois, USA: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Ravenscroft, S., & Williams, P. F. (2009). Making imaginary worlds real: The case of 
expensing employee stock options. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6-7), 
770-786.  
Robson, K. (1994). Inflation accounting and action at a distance: The sandilands episode. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(1), 45-82. 
Robson, K., & Bottausci, C. (2017). The sociology of translation and accounting inscriptions: 
Reflections on Latour and accounting research. Critical Perspectives on Accounting. 
doi: 10.1016/j.cpa.2017.11.003 
Robson, K., & Young, J. J. (2009). Socio-political studies of financial reporting and standard-
setting, In Chapman, C., Cooper, D., and Miller, P. (Eds.) Accounting, Organizations, 
and Institutions: Essays in Honour of Anthony Hopwood (pp. 341-366). Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Robson, K., Young, J., & Power, M. (2017). Themed section on financial accounting as 
social and organizational practice: Exploring the work of financial reporting. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 56, 35-37. 
Shiller, R. J. (1981). Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in 
dividends? American Economic Review, 71(3), 421-436. 
Shiller, R. J. (2000). Irrational Exuberance. New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press. 
Shiller, R. J. (2014). Speculative asset prices. American Economic Review, 104(6), 1486-
1517. 
Skærbæk, P., & Tryggestad, K. (2010). The role of accounting devices in performing 
corporate strategy. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35(1), 108-124. 
Solomons, D. (1991). Accounting and social change: A neutralist view. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 16(3), 287-295. 
Soufian, M., Forbes, W., & Hudson, R. (2014). Adapting financial rationality: Is a new 
paradigm emerging? Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 25(8), 724-742. 
Sunder, S. (2016). Better financial reporting: Meanings and means. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 35(3), 211-223. 
Themsen, T. N., & Skærbæk, P. (2018). The performativity of risk management frameworks 
and technologies: The translation of uncertainties into pure and impure 
risks. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 67, 20-33. 
Tinker, T. (1991). The accountant as partisan. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16(3), 
297-310. 
Tryggestad, K. (2005). Natural and political markets: organizing the transfer of technology 
and knowledge. Economy and Society, 34(4), 589-611. 
Vollmer, H., Mennicken, A., & Preda, A. (2009). Tracking the numbers: Across accounting 
and finance, organizations and markets. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
34(5), 619-637.  
Walker, S. P. (2016). Revisiting the roles of accounting in society. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 49, 41-50. 
Warren, L., & Seal, W. (2018). Using investment appraisal models in strategic negotiation: 
The cultural political economy of electricity generation. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society. doi: 10.1016/j.aos.2018.04.001 
64 
 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the determination of 
accounting standards. The Accounting Review, 53(1), 112-134. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1979). The demand for and supply of accounting theories: 
the market for excuses. The Accounting Review, 54(2), 273-305. 
Whitley, R. (1986). The transformation of business finance into financial economics: The 
roles of academic expansion and changes in US capital markets. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 11(2), 171-192. 
Williams, P. F., & Ravenscroft, S. P. (2015). Rethinking decision usefulness. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 32(2), 763-788.    
Woolgar, S., & Lezaun, J. (2015). Missing the (question) mark? What is a turn to ontology? 
Social Studies of Science, 45(3), 462-467. 
Young, J. J. (1995). Getting the accounting right: Accounting and the savings and loan crisis. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(1), 55-80. 
Young, J. J. (2006). Making up users. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(6), 579-
600. 
Young, J. J. (2014). Separating the political and technical: Accounting standard-setting and 
purification. Contemporary Accounting Research, 31(3), 713-747. 
Young, J. J., & Williams, P. F. (2010). Sorting and comparing: Standard-setting and “ethical” 
categories. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 21(6), 509-521. 
Zuckerman, E. W. (2012). Market efficiency: A sociological perspective. In Knorr Cetina, K. 
and Preda, A. (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance (pp. 223-249). 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
